

TURKEY

By

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CONTENTS

| CHAP. | PAGE |
|---|------|
| I. THE LAND | 7 |
| II. THE PEOPLE | 12 |
| III. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE | 17 |
| IV. THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNIZATION | 23 |
| V. THE BEGINNINGS OF REFORM | 27 |
| VI. MUSTAFA KEMAL | 35 |
| VII. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE | 42 |
| VIII. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM | 51 |
| IX. THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION | 62 |
| X. THE VILLAGE | 73 |
| XI. BUILDING AN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM | 83 |
| XII. TURKEY IN THE MODERN WORLD | |
| i. Foreign Trade | 91 |
| ii. Foreign Policy | 96 |
| EPILOGUE | 112 |
| FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING | 115 |
| INDEX | 118 |

ILLUSTRATIONS

| PLATE | PAGE |
|--|------|
| I. HIGHWAY AND BYWAY | 13 |
| II. RULERS AND LEADERS | 18 |
| III. THE NEW CAPITAL | 29 |
| IV. LAW AND ORDER | 34 |
| V. MUHAMMADANISM AND MODERNISM | 49 |
| VI. FOOD AND WATER | 66 |
| VII. FURNACE, BENCH, AND LOOM | 75 |
| VIII. DEFENCE | 97 |

MAPS

| | |
|---|-----|
| THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF TURKEY | 116 |
| TURKEY: AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL WEALTH | 117 |

CHAPTER I

THE LAND

TURKEY lies at the cross-roads of history. The land-mass of Asia Minor or Anatolia and the eastern tip of the Balkans—Eastern Thrace or Turkey-in-Europe—have been since the beginnings of civilization the bridge between Europe and the East. Across this bridge the West has thrust out into the desert lands of the Middle East. Across it, the Eastern peoples—Seljuk Turks, Tartars, Osmanlis—surged back when Western military and political power decayed. The troubled history of Asia Minor is largely due to this frontier position between two civilizations, and it is only in this century that the cultural frontier has been destroyed by the self-absorption of Turkey into the civilization of the West.

From north to south, too, Turkey's geography has plunged the country into a sea of political troubles. The narrow strip of water which joins the Black Sea to the Aegean is the chief ice-free outlet to the oceans of the world of the vast hinterland of European Russia. With the growth of the Russian Empire from the sixteenth century onwards and the expansion of its power southwards, the possession or control of the Straits came to be the goal of its policy in the Balkans and the Black Sea. This fact, coupled with the desire of the European Powers to frustrate the ambition, created the "Eastern Question" of the late nineteenth century.

These cross-currents are as active in Turkish history to-day as at any time in the past hundred years. The West, in the shape of Hitler's Third Reich, is pressing on the land frontiers of Turkey in Thrace, while the revolt

in Iraq and the German use of Syrian air bases last spring were a reminder that the *Drang nach Osten* had temporarily reached Baghdad. With the invasion of Russia, Germany's power has been steadily lengthening out along the shores of the Black Sea and a threat to Turkey's eastern frontiers via the Caucasus has become a possibility. This German threat is rapidly transforming Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, the powerful successor of the old Czarist Empire. Between 1939 and 1941, while the Russians were attempting to widen their territorial defences against Germany by annexations in Eastern Europe, the Turks feared lest the age-old question of the control of the Straits might be raised again. The invasion of Russia and Germany's advance eastwards are rendering these fears obsolete.

Turkey has been fought over more as a means to something else—control of the Straits or access to the lands beyond her frontiers, to east or west—than as a conquest or a possession valuable in itself. The area of 296,356 square miles is not very fertile and is still largely undeveloped. The interior of the country is a kind of continuation of the steppes of Central Asia, high, wide, and barren, covered with snow in winter and scorched by the sun through the summer. If you go up from the sea-coast to Sivas or to Ankara—the capital, once Angora—you must cross a series of plateaux covered with thin prairie grass and cut off from each other by scorched brown hills with fantastic jagged skylines. Hills and prairies are treeless except for occasional plantations or scrub, and the farther to the east you journey, the barer the land, the higher the mountains, the more forbidding the whole countryside.

Only in the north, along the coasts of the Black Sea, are there forests, and this lack of trees is partly responsible for the dry climate of the interior of Anatolia. The Ottoman Turks were warriors, not planters of trees. They denuded the country without thought of climate or

cultivation, and even as late as 1914, trees were cut down recklessly in the region of Adana for war purposes. If it were not for the winter snow, a large part of the Anatolian uplands would be completely desert. As it is, they yield good, hard grain and graze the Mohair goats whose fine, long wool produces soft Angora cloth.

The map is misleading on this matter of water. Turkey is criss-crossed with rivers, most of them rising high up in the central *massif*. They suggest an abundance of water, or at least extensive possibilities for irrigation. However, you can drive from Izmir (Smyrna) to Ankara in summer without seeing any rivers at all. Only the bridges will be there—wide stone bridges solidly built and spanning a dry rubble of sticks and pebbles which in the spring is a swirling torrent of brown, soil-laden rain-water. What could be done by tree-planting and irrigation is shown at the capital itself. The water-supply at Ankara is totally inadequate, and all round the city stretch out the barren hills, golden brown and baking hot under the midday sun, amethyst and crimson, and suddenly and treacherously cold at sundown. But Ankara itself and two or three valley-bottoms leading out from the city are beginning to look green again. Thousands of acacia trees line the streets of the new city, orchards and plantations follow the roads out, and at the Cubuk Barrage, the most important irrigation scheme yet completed in Turkey, the reservoirs are surrounded by parks and gardens where the citizens of Ankara can come out and sit and drink under palms and acacias. This transformation is especially striking when seen from the air. The aeroplane approaching the airport for Ankara from Istanbul crosses range after range of dry, yellow hills; then suddenly the land between the hills turns green, and green ribbons run along the valleys and, where farms and orchards are growing, stretch up the hillside. The Turks maintain that the climate at Ankara has already changed as a result.

Only round the coasts is the climate more moderate and variegated. The Black Sea coastal plain is very narrow, save at Samsun, where it widens into the valley of the Kizil Irmak. The sea tempers the weather here to something resembling a normal Mediterranean climate. There is even an important orange-producing area beyond Samsun. Unfortunately, the Black Sea breeds sudden heavy storms which lash the coast and make the harbours—Zonguldak, Samsun, Trabzon—uncertain for shipping. It is possible to stand where the Bosphorus runs out of the Black Sea and see a squall race across the water, turning the blue sky indigo and the blue waves black. The Greeks called the Black Sea the Euxine, the "Good Sea", for the same superstitious reason that they called the Furies, the Eumenides, or the "well-disposed ones". The sea is no less treacherous to-day.

The Black Sea affects the climate of Istanbul. The cold air from the north blows down the Bosphorus, or with a change in the direction of the wind, meets the warm wind from the south to cause local fog. In winter, there is drizzle and constant mist and snow; in summer, the atmosphere is so full of humidity that even moderate days are more uncomfortable than really hot weather farther south. It is sometimes maintained that this warm, damp, enervating climate on the Bosphorus has influenced the course of Turkish history. The Ottoman Turks came from the East to conquer the decaying Byzantine Empire. In their turn they made Constantinople their capital, and gradually succumbed to the relaxing air and enervating heat. Constantinople, like Vienna, became a tyranny *gemildert durch Schlamperei*, "made milder by casualness". When Kemal Atatürk raised the standard of rebellion, he worked from the heights of Anatolia and, after victory, chose for his capital one of the bleakest and most bracing of its cities. The break with Constantinople was psychological as well as geographical and historical. It was a challenge to official-

dom, to the bureaucrats, to the politicians, to take in the programme of the new Turkey along with deep draughts of biting mountain air. The experiment appears to have been successful—up to a point. Every official and business man in Ankara shows a marked tendency to escape to Istanbul at the week-end, and the old city is virtually the capital in the hottest of the summer months. There are, for example, summer legations along the Bosphorus from Pera to Therapia, and the diplomatic corps tends to migrate.


To the south, round Smyrna, Turkish climate is at its best—mild in the winter, hot and dry in the summer. The Turks called Smyrna *Güzel* Izmir—beautiful Izmir—and it is a place of gardens and orchards and rich farms. The Aegean Coast as a whole is fertile and luxuriant, with trees and fruits and flowers found nowhere else, save in a scattered way along the northern coast and to some extent on the Mediterranean seaboard. Here the narrow coastal plain which broadens out beyond Adana into the Plain of Cilicia is sub-tropical. Cotton and tobacco are grown, and it is the area of large-scale agriculture.

This, then, is the rather unpromising physical patrimony of the Turks: a great central plateau of dry steppes, turbulent rivers, and sun-baked treeless hills, rising to the east to the mountains of Armenia, and fringed by a narrow coastal plain which accounts for most of the agricultural riches of the country. To this must be added the rolling plains of Eastern Thrace, where grain is grown under climatic conditions resembling the American Middle West. Small in size, this tip of the European Continent includes, besides Istanbul, a large percentage of Turkey's population, a sure index of fertility.

CHAPTER II

THE PEOPLE

TURKEY is still underpopulated. There is no problem of *Lebensraum*, for land is still waiting to be taken up and brought under cultivation. Although the present birth-rate 23 per 1,000 is one of the highest in the world, the density of population is only 54 people to the square mile. In Great Britain it is 468. It is true that the land is not over-fertile, and that about 14 per cent. can never be brought into cultivation at all—for example, the land surrounding the salt lake at Touz Gol near Konya. Nevertheless the 18 million inhabitants (the figure for October 1940) of contemporary Turkey can probably double and treble before they will really feel the pinch of lacking land. Under the *pax Romana* there is reason to believe that there were perhaps four times as many inhabitants in Asia Minor as at the beginning of Atatürk's régime. There are areas where beside the cabins and stone huts of a few peasants lie the ruins of cities which grew up and flourished in classical times. The ruins of Ephesus, once a great metropolis of free men, now lie tangled in weeds half buried in a swamp. A few stones are all that there is to be seen on "the ringing plains of windy Troy". Plague, mosquitoes, but above all war have depopulated Asia Minor. For centuries the sturdy mountain people were the permanent reservoir for the armies of their conquerors, and while the men were sent to fight and die from Vienna to the Yemen, taxes ruined agriculture, and looting and tree-cutting transformed a fertile countryside into the open prairie of to-day. With every tree they plant, the Turks are attempting to undo the depredations of cen-



I. HIGHWAY
AND
BYWAY
(*Keystone Press*)

1. THE BOSPHORUS

2. STREET IN
ISTANBUL

turies. And as long as the work is incomplete, there is a margin of land and prosperity into which the vigorously growing Turkish people can expand.

The population of Turkey is the product of its history. Anatolia has been crossed and recrossed by the armies of a hundred invaders, and behind them has been left the silt of many races and many cultures. Whether or not—as the new Turkish interpretation of history demands—the original inhabitants of Anatolia were Turanian in origin, coming from the country between the Urals and the Altai, it is true that archaeology gives evidence of a marked persistence in the Turkish racial type. It is sometimes called “Hittite” or “Armenoid”. The head is broad and large, the features well marked, the nose often hooked. Skin and hair are usually dark. But this is only a norm. In fact, anyone travelling in Turkey will be struck by the variety of racial types, especially as he will tend to meet the educated classes where the greatest racial variety is naturally to be found.

The conquerors from the West, the Greeks, then the Romans, have left their mark. The conquerors from the East—Seljuks, Tartars, and Osmanlis—were of roughly the same origin as the “Hittite” groundstock of Anatolia. As we shall see, the peculiar institutions of the Ottoman Empire encouraged racial intermixture on the one hand through its absorption of Christians into the administrative machine, discouraged it on the other by the *millet* system, in which religious communities, usually coextensive with a racial group, were allowed to form independent and autonomous communities. There have also been strong Semitic influences, especially in the south, from the Assyrian traders of earliest times to the latter-day Jews, who long shared the commercial life of the Ottoman Empire with the Greeks.

The present population of Turkey is 85 per cent. Turkish. This is not a racial but a *national* computation. People are Turks who speak Turkish and live within the

confines of the Turkish Republic. There are one or two minorities, of which the Kurds are the most important. They are over a million strong, and inhabit the border country over against Iraq and Iran. They are nomads and fanatical Moslems, and the Turkish Government has had to deal with a series of revolts—the first in 1925, the most recent in 1937—directed against both the secularism and the authority of the central government. In spite of the minority guarantees of the Treaty of Lausanne, strong measures have been taken with the Kurds. They are Turkish from the hour of birth. They are taught Turkish at school. Some communities have been split up and settled in other parts of the country. At the same time, attempts are being made to increase the agricultural development of the eastern provinces. The revolt in 1937 lasted some months before it was brought under control, and there has been no report of further trouble since then. But it is probably not only for the benefit of frontier defence that the Turkish Government maintains a military administration in the Eastern vilayets (or provinces).

A serious minority problem would have remained as a legacy from the Ottoman Empire, had it not been possible after the last war to arrange for the exchange of the Greek minority in Turkey for the Turkish minority in Greece. The Greeks lived for the most part in Smyrna itself and in its hinterland, and the aim of the Greek Government in landing troops in Smyrna in 1919 was undoubtedly to detach the Greek enclave from Turkey. Had the Greek minority remained there even after the end of the Turco-Greek war, the Turkish Government would hardly have recovered from its suspicion that possession of the Aegean coastline was an underlying objective of Greek policy; the Greek minority would have suffered economically and socially inside Turkey and would have been a permanent cause of friction in the external relations of the two countries.

However, Greek and Turkish delegates negotiated directly with each other, and early in 1923 agreed to a transfer of populations. The problem might well have seemed insoluble, since there were many hundreds of thousands more Greeks than Turks, but over a million Greeks had already fled from Turkey before negotiations were opened. As it was, the delegates were able to agree to terms covering the transfer and settlement of property, to allow the Moslems of Greek Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul to remain in their homes, and to transfer the working out of the scheme to a neutral Commission of the League under the control of Dr. Nansen. An international loan of £12 millions covered the work of the Commission, and while most of the transfers occurred in the first three years, the task was not completed until 1935. The Turks who immigrated from Greece to Turkey must have left farms and property for about half the Greek emigrants from Turkey. The Turks arriving in Turkey found the Greek districts round Smyrna sacked and ravaged by the savage course of the war. Yet by all accounts very little pauperization has followed as a result of the uprooting—indeed, none at all in Turkey—and the smooth history of Turco-Greek relations between the two wars bears witness to the soundness of the measure. If other troubled frontiers are to be settled in this fashion, the example of Dr. Nansen's work cannot be neglected. With his experience to refer to, it is possible that an exchange could be carried through even more smoothly.

CHAPTER III

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

THE racial make-up of the Turks has had less to do with their national characteristics than the history of the Turkish community through the centuries of its exposure to the pressure, cultural and military, of conquest and counter-conquest. Until the seventh century, Anatolia was still Western in culture, a hellenized province of imperial Byzantium (or Constantinople). But although the city of Constantinople was to withstand the attack from the East for seven centuries more, the Byzantine Empire was already in decay. The Arabs, newly converted to Islam, attacked the capital as early as 671, and the stage was set for the swallowing up of Anatolia by the Orient, from which the Greeks under Alexander the Great had first captured it.

The process was slow, but by the middle of the eleventh century the Seljuk Turks, also Moslems, had overrun the whole of the Near East and set up in Anatolia the province of Rum. The Seljuks expanded steadily to the west, but their empire was short-lived, largely because of their habit of dividing the territory they conquered into fiefs for their followers, who then fought desperately among themselves. In the thirteenth century Anatolia was a scene of anarchy under an impotent Seljuk overlord. The Byzantine Emperor at Constantinople was, however, himself too weak to profit by this interregnum to expand and reinforce his frontiers.

One of the fiefs of Rum was held by a local chieftain named Ertugrul. Probably on the command of the Sultan, he held the key frontier district over against the Byzantine province of Nicea. In 1281 he was succeeded



II. RULERS AND LEADERS (Exclusive News Agency)

1. ABDUL HAMID
2. ENVER PASHA
3. PRESIDENT ISMET INONU
4. ATATÜRK

by his son, Osman, who expanded his fief and rallied certain other Seljuk chieftains to his standard. Osman's son Orhan, was the first Turk to gain a foothold in Europe—at Gallipoli. His successors overran the Balkans, and finally in 1453 Constantinople fell to the Osmanli Sultan Mehmet II, after resisting four earlier sieges. Thus the sons of Osman set up not only a new dynasty, but a new empire. They found the Seljuk Empire of Rum in anarchy and decay, but played their part in defending its frontiers. From their successful defence grew not a restored Rum, but a totally new State, the Ottoman Empire. The analogy is interesting, for it was to be repeated in 1919, when Kemal Atatürk rallied the decaying Ottoman Empire and founded not a restored Empire, but the new Republic of Turkey.

The new Empire was remarkable for certain of its social institutions. The Seljuk Turks, of which the Osmanlis were a branch, were nomad conquerors from the Central Asian steppes. Wherever they went, they went as soldiers and overlords. They did not till the soil. They knew nothing of commerce. Their social experience was with flocks and herds, and their idea of conquest was to adapt to their human subjects the methods of animal husbandry. The name *Re'iyah*, which was applied to the subject peoples, meant human cattle, and exactly described their function. Their work and their output provided the economic foundation of the Osmanli power. They were milked and shorn and occasionally skinned. Provided they were peaceful, their way of life was not interfered with—the various racial and religious communities were allowed to preserve their own identity—but any trace of insubordination was ruthlessly crushed by the “watchdogs” of the régime, the celebrated slave household of the Sultan.

This slave household, from which all the military and civil executives were drawn, was recruited entirely from among the non-Moslem subjects of the Empire.

The children were taken young, trained in a rigid discipline at the Sultan's court, and then, although still slaves in status, could rise to any height in the service of the Sultan. By this system they became the Sultan's men in the fullest sense, without ties of family or race, watchdogs *par excellence*, devoted only to the cause of their master. This system remained intact until the height of Ottoman power. After 1566 the slaves insisted on entering their children for enrolment, and the Moslems secured the entry of their sons. The earlier efficiency and iron discipline declined, the watchdogs began either to eat each other or to run with the flock, and the decline of the system coincided with a general decay of the Empire.

Beside the slave household, the other most remarkable institution was that of the *millet*. It meant that within the State various communities were organized autonomously, in most cases under a religious head, and had power, under the general authority of the Sultan, to manage their own affairs. The Moslem subjects, the free landlords, and the Moslem peasants were under the Grand Mufti at Constantinople. Next in importance was the "Millet-i-Rum", the community of Orthodox Christians under the Oecumenical Patriarch, again at Constantinople. The Patriarch was always a Greek, and his position tended to make the Greeks co-partners with the Sultan. There was an Armenian millet under the Gregorian Patriarch, a Jewish millet under the Grand Rabbi, and a Catholic millet under the Pope's delegate.

This same principle was applied to the foreign traders who settled in the Empire. These merchants—from Venice, Holland, England, and France—living in a number of Levantine ports, were organized in autonomous communities under the presidency of their ambassadors. They had extra-territorial privileges laid down in charters or "capitulations" granted by the Sultan.

They were tolerated, since they provided merchandise which the thoroughly uncommercial Osmanlis themselves never thought of producing.

This extraordinary system was at its zenith, in the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66), when the Ottoman Empire stretched from the gates of Vienna to the Yemen and from Persia almost to the Pillars of Hercules. But the bolt was almost shot. Mehmet IV (1673-87) was the last conqueror. The Ottoman Empire was faced now with the sudden emergence of a westernized Czarist Empire and with the Central European Empire of the Habsburgs. Throughout the eighteenth century the Turks were being steadily thrust on to the defensive, and in 1774 the Russians brought a six-year war against them to a victorious conclusion with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji.

From this point the retreat of the Empire became more rapid. Had it not been for the anxiety of the other European Powers to prevent the Czars from extending their rule to Constantinople and the Dardanelles, the Osmanli power would have been broken far sooner. As it was, throughout the nineteenth century the "sick man" was constantly receiving artificial stimulants—from Britain, from France, from Austria-Hungary, from Germany—to ensure that he could still act as a buffer State between them and Russia's expanding power, and still perform his functions as doorkeeper of the Straits. Thus from 1854 to 1856 France and Britain were Turkey's allies against Russia in the Crimean War, and in 1878 all the European Powers joined in the Congress of Berlin to prevent too great an extension of Russia's influence among the Orthodox Christians of the Balkans, who were, with Russia's help, drawing out of the Ottoman Empire and forming themselves into independent and autonomous States.

In spite of this brake on Turkey's decline and fall, the disintegration was remarkably rapid. Algeria was lost

to France in 1830, and Tunisia in 1881; Cyprus went to Britain in 1878 and Egypt in 1882; Tripolitania to Italy in 1911. So much for the "overseas" possessions of the Empire. In the Black Sea and Balkan area, Russia took the Crimea and Georgia in 1783, Serbia had achieved autonomy by 1817, Greece by 1829, Rumania by 1861. Bulgaria declared its complete independence in 1908, and the European possessions of a Turkey, which in 1526 had destroyed the old kingdom of Hungary at Mohacs, and a little over a hundred years later was besieging Vienna, were reduced by 1913 to the tip of Eastern Thrace. The war of 1914-1918, in which Turkey fought on the side of Germany, completed the dismemberment of the Empire. As a result of the brilliant campaigning of Lawrence and Allenby, the Turkish provinces of the East—Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Arabia—were lost to Britain, France, and the Arabs. The Armistice of Mudros which brought the war to an end on October 30th, 1918, left the armies of the Allies in control of Constantinople and in occupation of the Straits and Cilicia. Not even the homelands of Anatolia were preserved, and according to the Treaty of Sèvres, signed two years later (August 10th, 1920), independent Turkey was reduced to the poorest, bleakest lands round Ankara, while the Straits and Constantinople were to come under international control, Smyrna and its hinterland to go to the Greeks, the Mediterranean seaboard to be divided between the Italians and the French, while Britain and the United States were to protect a "free and independent" Armenian State in the Eastern vilayets. According to this treaty, Ottoman Turkey was reduced almost to the size of the fief of Ertugrul from which it sprang.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNIZATION

THE Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji is a turning-point in the history of the Ottoman Empire, for it brought to an end a war in which, for the first time, the military superiority of the West over the armies of the "infidel Turk" was clearly demonstrated. In the earlier wars the disciplined troops of the Sultan, with the Janissaries—the soldiers drawn from the slave household—as the *corps d'élite*, had proved superior to the feudal levies of Western Europe. The new armies of Russia, however, represented an improvement in organization and technique which reflected the great changes that were coming over the face of Western society. By 1770 the dominant features of the political and social revolution which was to transform Western civilization into a worldwide force were already established. The centralized, organized, nation-state had become the dominant system of political organization. Nationalism was growing to fanatical strength. With it went the corollaries of freedom, representative government, and the rights of man. The application of scientific method to every sphere of human existence was extending. Western Europe stood on the brink of the Industrial Revolution. In the Orient, none of these changes had come about. On the contrary, even the efficiency of the Sultan's household was declining as a result of favouritism and nepotism. East and West no longer met as equals, and the Ottoman Empire began to face the ordeal which in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries awaited every oriental State which had dealings with the West.

Western civilization is an overwhelmingly powerful

dissolvent of non-Western customs and institutions. Oriental States brought into contact with the expanding energy of Western life have either succumbed in complete anarchy and been taken over and administered by a Western Power—such was the fate of India or Egypt—or they have reacted violently against the invading force and defeated it by adopting all its methods and institutions—Japan is the outstanding example of this reaction—or they have followed both courses, first disintegrating to the point of collapse, and then, with a superhuman effort, adopting Western institutions in time to forestall their imposition by a foreign Power. The reaction of the Ottoman Empire represented the first alternative, that of collapse. Its history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a vain attempt to move to the second alternative, voluntary Westernization; the revolution of Kemal Atatürk was the successful achievement—at the eleventh hour—of the third alternative.

It is hardly extraordinary that the Ottoman Empire could not achieve the necessary Westernization. It had neither the religious nor the cultural background. The spirit of Islam, *Kismet*, resignation to things that are, was profoundly opposed to the activist, reformist Christianity of the West, with its hope of human betterment and the secular version of it in the search for an earthly kingdom. The social changes in Western life had long preceded the reforms in military organization which gave the Turks the first taste of Western efficiency. There had been no corresponding developments in the life of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, there could be none, for the institutions of the nomadic conquerors, designed to keep their subjects in check, the easier to tax and exploit them, were not capable of change, least of all in the direction of national self-determination, responsible citizenship and economic opportunity. Knowing instinctively that Westernization must inevitably split the Em-

pire from end to end, the Sultans set their face resolutely against any serious modification in the status of their subject peoples. They might as well have blown against an Atlantic gale.

Only in one sphere were they ready for change. It was the sphere which touched them most closely. Unfortunately, it was the sphere from which progressive Western ideas could with the greatest difficulty spread to the body politic. The Sultans began with the Army. Early in the nineteenth century Mehmet Ali took ex-Napoleonic officers into the Egyptian army, and a Prussian military mission was active in Turkey in the eighteen-thirties. Conscription with long years of service was introduced—to add to the burden of the peasants of Anatolia—and although it increased discipline and efficiency and led to greater ease in the collection of taxes, as an instrument of Westernization it was frustrated from the start. Its main purpose was to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But this integrity could be preserved only by flouting one of the strongest elements in contemporary Western thought, the desire for national self-determination. The nineteenth century saw an almost unbroken series of revolts against Ottoman overlordship which the Turkish army was called on to crush, using its Western technique to suppress the spread of Western ideas. This only increased the sense of frustration and moral disintegration.

The attempt to Westernize the army without any modification of the institutions of the Empire had fatal economic consequences. The economy of the Ottoman State was still that of nomadic conquerors living off the exploitation of sedentary peasant cultivators. The agriculturists were already loaded with debt. All the commercial life of the country was in the hands of the *millets*, the Greeks and Armenians or the foreign merchants enjoying extra-territorial rights under "capitulations". The Westernization of the army demanded more money

than this primitive economic system could hope to provide. The peasants were squeezed still further, but the Sultans had to turn for loans to the Western *entrepreneurs* who already controlled the Empire's commerce. This money was simply squandered in attempts to keep the subject peoples of the Empire quiet under the yoke. Since it was utterly unproductive, there was nothing with which to serve interest on the loans, and with each default on the part of the Turkish Government, the stranglehold of Western finance on the economy of Turkey increased. By the beginning of the twentieth century the Empire, which was vainly trying to maintain its rule over its dissident national minorities, was itself virtually under the control of the financial and commercial interests of the Western Powers. In 1882, after the bankruptcy caused by another war with Russia, the Council of Foreign Bondholders took over six vital sources of Turkish revenue to administer them directly.

Nevertheless the ferment of Westernization was there, even if it was operating in circumstances too unfavourable to leave room for any hope for the Empire, and between 1850 and 1920 there were three distinct movements of reform on Western lines. The third—that of Kemal Atatürk—was successful. It is doubtful whether it could have been so without the painful and largely unsuccessful preparatory work of the reformers who went before him.

CHAPTER V

THE BEGINNINGS OF REFORM

IN 1856 Turkey had, in company with France and Britain, just defeated Russia. This victory relieved the pressure of the various Foreign Powers on Turkey. The alliance brought the Empire into contact with two of the most progressive Western States. The political atmosphere was apparently favourable to progress and reform, and an enlightened Turkish administrator, Midhat Pasha, undertook local reforms in Bulgaria and Mesopotamia. He tried to govern in association with the leaders of the various nationalities, he reformed the police, took steps to increase economic prosperity, and set up mixed elementary schools where boys of every nationality could receive a good education without going abroad to learn anti-Ottoman ideas.¹ His culminating idea was a system of parliamentary government in which all the nationalities of the Empire would receive proportional representation. His project failed. It was far too radical for the Turkish Government. In 1876 Abdul Hamid introduced a régime of black oppression, of which Midhat Pasha was one of the first victims. On the other hand, the project was far too mild for the nationalities, who now demanded—and in the Balkans at least were rapidly obtaining—complete national independence.

¹ This quotation from the life of Ziya Gökalp, one of modern Turkey's intellectual leaders, illustrates the *impasse* which Ottoman Turkey had reached. A guest at the house of Ziya's father said:

" 'You must send Ziya to Europe to become learned.' . . . Said my father, 'If he goes to Europe, he will become an infidel.' . . . Guest: 'Eh, if he stays here?' Father: 'He will become an ass.' " (Enver Behnan, *Filozof Gök Alp*, p. 16.)

The next movement of reform, the "Young Turk" revolt of 1908, broke on the same reef of nationalism. It was significant that this new drive for Western reform came on the whole from the young officers, who alone among the Turkish population had been allowed under Abdul Hamid to continue any sort of close contact with the West (the introduction of Western books was forbidden under the Hamidian régime). Their leader was Enver Pasha, and the Committee of Union and Progress was an organization which corresponded to some extent to the Party in the modern totalitarian State. These young officers showed all the limitations of their upbringing and environment. The army had been Westernized in order to maintain the integrity of the Empire, and the Young Turks were no more alive to the contradictions of the policy than the degenerate sovereign they drove from the throne. The Committee of Union and Progress proposed the enfranchisement on an equal footing of all Turkey's nationalities. They ignored the fact that the nationalities were already long past the stage of equal representation *within* somebody else's Empire and already possessed the nuclei of independent States of their own. Moreover, the Young Turks themselves had deserted the old dynastic conception of the Ottoman Empire. Their new Empire was emphatically a Turkish Empire, and in fact they were inviting the nationalities in on equal terms, *provided they became Turks*—a fantastic proposal at a time when the nationalities were already throwing off the yoke of the old non-national Ottoman Empire. The result of the Revolution of 1908 was thus not a consolidation of the Empire, but a further step in its disintegration. Bulgaria declared its independence, and in 1912 the new Balkan States temporarily joined forces to drive the Turks out of all their remaining territories west of the River Maritza.

The Young Turks may have hoped to improve their position by joining the Great War against Russia and



III. THE NEW CAPITAL (Keystone Press)

1. VIEW OF OLD ANKARA
2. THE MODERN CITY

the West on the side of the Central Powers, but in fact the war only did for Turkey's eastern provinces—Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine—what the long series of Balkan wars had done for the western. The Arab revolt, sponsored by the Allies, drove the Turks back on Asia Minor, and by 1918 the Turkish lands of Anatolia were invaded west and east.

The Young Turk Revolution failed in the first place because its national *âlan* was still concerned with the non-national Ottoman Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress had to choose between nationalism and the preservation of the Empire. Their attempt to choose both involved them in complete frustration. There were other reasons for failure—for example, the extent to which they had to rely upon the old corrupt Hamidian civil service, upon men whose minds were obstinately closed to the West. The confining of Western education to the military caste meant that in 1908 there were few civilians capable of undertaking any measures of reform. It is significant that both Enver Pasha of the 1908 Revolution and Mustafa Kemal of the 1919 Revolution were army officers. None of the economic problems was tackled under the Young Turk régime. By 1908 the whole economic life of the country was mortgaged. The banking system was foreign-owned and operated. French investors controlled the Ottoman Bank. Germany financed most of the railway building, and after 1910 Germany's general share in Turkey's indebtedness increased enormously. Irrigation, ports and harbours, municipal utilities, coal-fields, mining enterprises were all under foreign control. The Young Turks had no solution for this dependence. On the contrary, they heavily increased their country's commitments to Germany, and in 1914, as a last gesture of irresponsibility, plunged the Turks into war.

Nevertheless, the Revolution of 1908, followed by the upheaval in habit and thought which any major modern

war is bound to occasion, did make possible a number of reforms and changes which were probably an indispensable prelude to the Kemalist Revolution.

In the whole sphere of education the ban on contact with Western thought was completely raised, a Society for National Education and Training was started, and the University of Istanbul increased its classes and undertook extension work. The result was a generation of young men who by 1922 were ready for service in a modernized State. Since Midhat Pasha and Enver Pasha failed largely because their efforts were limited by the limited number of educated sympathizers and executives upon whom they could call, the importance of this educational preparation for the work of Atatürk is obvious. Connected with this educational renaissance was the cultural movement known as the "Turkish Hearth", the *Türk Ocakı*. Its aim was to carry to the people love and consciousness of Turkish national culture, to arrange for lectures, to set up centres where people could meet and discuss. By the beginning of the last war there were more than twenty-five branches in Anatolia. Here was an entirely new departure—the beginnings of an attempt to create a popular, nationalist movement in the neglected homeland of the Turks.

Some legislative reforms were possible in the stress of war. Capitulations were abolished in September 1914, and the codes of civil and commercial law were revised as a result. Prison reforms were prepared and a law to introduce the metric system was enacted. The importance of these steps is that they represent for the first time an attempt to see the process of modernizing the Turkish system *as a whole*. Hitherto, Westernization had been grudgingly attempted where the lack of it seemed likely to endanger the existence of the State—in other words, in the army, and hardly anywhere else. The result was an incoherent, disintegrating system where neither old nor new had any hold upon the community.

These pre-Kemalist reforms had particular relevance to one sphere of the nation's life—the position of women. The Young Turks were not in principle disposed to alter the disabilities imposed by Islam on women, but many of the reformers associated with the Committee of Union and Progress saw well enough that to attempt to build a modern State in which women were held in Moslem subjection would only prolong the inconsistencies and frustrations with which their attempts were already clogged. The Turkish leader and thinker, Ziya Gökalp, who was virtually the intellectual dictator of Turkey during the Great War, was one of the most active champions of the cause of women. He championed the view that according to “the original, pure, Turanian customs” of the early Turks, before they were corrupted by contact with Byzantium and Islam, women enjoyed complete equality with men. Under his influence a certain amount was done even during the war to improve their status. Family law was removed from the religious to the civil authorities in 1916, and in February 1917 polygamy was made subject to the first wife's agreement in writing. At the same time classes were opened to women at the University and the possibilities of Western education, which a few of the daughters of the wealthiest and most enlightened families had been receiving for about a decade, were opened up on a more generous scale. The “Turkish Hearth” movement made a particular point of securing mixed audiences at their lectures, and even encouraged women speakers. Here many of the workers in the Kemalist Revolution received their early training.

It is possible that these reforms would not have outlived the war. But the war itself was doing much for the emancipation of women. They became clerks and civil servants in the place of men called-up. They nursed the sick and worked in transport and labour battalions. The peasant women—who, it is true, had preserved a much

sturdier independence than their wealthier sisters, at the cost of much harder work—came into their own as the bulwark of the nation's food supply. It is probable that the emotional charge without which enacted reforms may well be shelved, was generated in these strenuous years of war. At the least, the raw material of the coming Revolution—changed lives, new thoughts, new hopes, uncertainties, frustrations, and a sense of search and adventure—was everywhere stored up. At the close of hostilities it still lacked form and shape and direction. These were to be provided by a soldier of the Imperial army, Mustafa Kemal.



IV. LAW AND ORDER

Reuben Price

1. LAWYER WITH CLIENTS
2. TRAFFIC POLICEMAN
3. WOMEN JUDGES



CHAPTER VI

MUSTAFA KEMAL

WHEN Mustafa Kemal (or Kemal Atatürk,¹ "Father of the Turks", as he came to be called) died in November 1938, the nation indulged in an orgy of grief such as has not been witnessed in the modern world. Women fainted with grief as the catafalque passed. Men wept in the streets, youths wept, children wept. And a year later it was still possible for an embarrassed European to attend a dinner-party in Ankara where, over dessert, at the mention of the dead President, the assembled company once again gave way to their grief and recounted with sobs reminiscences of their personal contacts with the great man. Kemal Atatürk was not only the originator and leader of the Kemalist Revolution: he seemed to be in some sense its embodied spirit. The reverence in which he was held was, for all his own scepticism and strongly secularist temper, of a semi-religious kind. If nationalism was the implement which forged the new State, Kemal Atatürk wielded the hammer and created the anvil, and it is to his human strength and intelligence, as much as to the revolutionary raw material he found, that the birth of a new Republic was due.

That he was aware of his emotional significance in the

¹ Atatürk was a surname adopted in 1932, when by law it became obligatory for all Turks to adopt surnames, which previously they had not had. At one time, for example, there were five indistinguishable General Kazıms. It was thanks to this reform that the present President of the Republic became İsmet İnönü; the surname was chosen for him specially by Atatürk in memory of his victory over the Greeks at İnönü in 1921.

Turkey of his making can be gathered from a speech he once made to his Party officials, in which he said: "There are two Mustafa Kemals. One is that sitting before you, the Mustafa Kemal of flesh and blood, who will pass away. There is another whom I cannot call 'me'. It is not I that this Mustafa Kemal personifies, it is you—all you present here, who go into the furthestmost parts of the country to inculcate and defend a new ideal, a new mode of thought. I stand for these dreams of yours. My life's work is to make them come true."

This intense personification of the Revolution in one man is not out of keeping with Turkish history. As one Turkish writer put it: "The fundamental quality of the Eastern soul, as it appears in Eastern history, has been always to accept a great genius."¹ There is an obverse side to this recognition of leadership—the inability to do without it. Almost everything which began after 1922 to grow and flourish in Kemalist Turkey was first planted by Atatürk and cared for by him in the fifteen years of his Presidency. The fact that many reforms had already been introduced before his coming is not decisive proof either that his work will last or that it cannot long survive him. On the one hand, it is evidence that he was moving with the current of history and had succeeded in judging exactly the tide in the affairs of men in so far as it affected his country. On the other, it proves that the Turkish nation could be caught in the current without power or ability to direct it for perhaps a century before the great leader appeared.

It was from the experiences of his youth and early manhood that Mustafa Kemal learnt to judge the historical situation of his country realistically and to avoid the contemporary errors of the Young Turks. He was born in 1881, at Salonika, of an Albanian father and a

¹ Felix Valéry, *Aménities in Islam*, p. 75. Kegan Paul, 1923.

Turkish mother. His early education included work on a farm, a short-lived and rebellious period at school in Salonika, and, finally, entry into the Military Cadet School. Here he came into contact with the officer caste who were the vanguard of Western ideas in Turkey, and he spent the time between his military studies at Salonika and later at Monastir in reading revolutionary French literature. It was from France that the greatest literary and intellectual influence was exercised upon Turkey. Contact with Napoleon's armies in Egypt had been an early lesson in the need for Westernization, and later had come the alliance during the Crimean War. It followed that much of the revolt seething in the minds of the young officers was conceived in terms of France and of 1789—liberty, equality, fraternity, the cult of reason, the power of science, the necessity of emancipation and enlightenment.

From Monastir, Mustafa Kemal was promoted with honour to the General Staff College at Istanbul. Here everybody was a revolutionary. The cadets organized a secret society (*Vatan* or Home Land) and produced a propaganda sheet. But whatever else was failing in the capital of Abdul Hamid, the police spy system was not, and before receiving his commission, Kemal spent some weeks in prison for treasonable activities. When he came out, his first post was in Damascus, virtually in exile. Here he organized a local branch of *Vatan* and attempted to keep in touch with his fellow-officer conspirators. On his return to Salonika a couple of years later he discovered that *Vatan*, now thoroughly under suspicion, had become the Committee of Union and Progress. He was at Salonika when in 1908 the Committee forced a change of government on the Sultan, and he took part in the march on Constantinople which changed the shadow of the Committee's power into the substance of constitutional government.

Enver was now virtually ruler, and Kemal distrusted both him and his policy, which seemed to stop short at adding members of the Committee to the Government's pay-roll. Accordingly, until the war Kemal was usually absent from the centre of affairs. He fought the Italians in Tripoli, then returned to take part in the battles for Adrianople in the First and Second Balkan Wars. His disapproval of Enver was by now so strong that he was again exiled, this time as military attaché to Sofia. The outbreak of war in 1914 found him there, and he was not recalled until 1915. The defence of the Dardanelles gave him his first chance to show his ability. The German officer commanding, General Liman von Sanders, trusted him, and it was his dogged and courageous resistance that broke the Allied attacks at Anzac and Suvla Bay and led to the withdrawal of their forces in December 1915. But Enver was now Commander-in-Chief, and very jealous; so the "Victor of the Dardanelles" was packed off to Erzerum, where the collapse of Russia in 1917 solved his military problem of defending an exposed frontier with a diseased and under-equipped Turkish army. At the time of the Armistice of Mudros, Kemal had just completed the retreat of an equally disintegrated army from Syria.

These were the formative years of Mustafa Kemal's life. First of all they gave him the insight to break once and for all with the idea of Empire. The Young Turk Revolt included among its supporters men as uncompromisingly nationalist as the philosopher Ziya Gökalp or the poet Mehmet Emin, who used to walk from village to village, talking to the people, reciting his verse to them, and leaving behind the memory of his couplet:

I am a Turk
My race and language are great.

But there was still confusion of thought over the question

whether this nationalism was expansive or "pan-Turanian", stretching out to all the Turkish-speaking peoples in Russia, or imperialist, aiming at the preservation under nationalist, Turkish hegemony of the whole existing Ottoman Empire, or—and this was the original and decisive contribution of Mustafa Kemal—simply nationalist in covering only the homelands of Anatolia, and removing for good any overlordship over other national groups. It was among the Druses, revolting beyond Damascus against the authority of the Sultan; among the Macedonians in revolt behind Salonika against the Ottoman Government; on the hot coasts of Tripoli defending an apathetic Arab people against the Italian invaders; before the walls of Adrianople driving off the Christian peoples of the Balkans united for once on the issue of turning out the Turk; among the sullen Armenian minorities on the Eastern frontier; and finally on the retreat before the advancing Arab insurgents—it was during these successive stages in his career that Kemal learnt the futility of Empire. He saw, as none of his predecessors and few of his contemporaries had seen, that it was the fruitless, wasteful attempt to preserve, at the cost of constant war, the Ottoman patrimony that lay at the root of Turkey's decadence, and that until nationalism meant simply the recovery and restoration of the Turkish race, within the framework of an independent national State, there was no future for the Turkish people.

But that was not all he learnt on his far wanderings and hapless campaigns. The experience of the Committee of Union and Progress suggested to him that it was virtually impossible to achieve far-reaching reforms by patching up the existing institutions of the Ottoman Empire. He was not to be confirmed in this belief until the disgraceful capitulation of the Sultan and the Committee of Union and Progress Government under Damad

Ferid to the victorious Allies in 1920—but his mind was turning in that direction before the end of the war.

Again, the chaotic condition of the Turkish army—the lack of any proper commissariat, of all decent medical facilities, of any efficiency and co-ordination at headquarters, the irresponsibility and ignorance of the officers—was evidence to Kemal of a decadence which went to the roots of the Ottoman State and was the reflection of a political and economic system that had virtually broken down. His suspicions that nothing could be retrieved from the old system were only confirmed by the daily evidence of Turkey's military and economic and administrative inadequacy.

At the same time, the behaviour, the dogged endurance, the patience, the heroism of the ordinary soldiers did more for the democratic temper of Kemal's mind than years of reading in the scholarly source-books of French liberalism. It filled him with an angry devotion for the rough sons of Anatolia, who for centuries had borne, either in the taxes on their fields or the guns on their shoulders, the full burden of the imperialist follies of the Sultanate.

Finally, Kemal's contacts with the German allies, and later with the Allied victors, added a touch of xenophobia to his strong nationalism. Thus when, at the age of thirty-seven, Kemal returned to Constantinople in the winter of 1918, his mind was already turning to new things—to an independent nationalist Turkish Republic, modernized from top to bottom, free of all foreign influence, and devoted to the welfare of the people of the homelands in Anatolia. He found a temper of collapse and resignation at the capital. The Allies were far off in Versailles, settling the fate of other more important nations. The Armistice still regulated Turkey's position, and the armies of occupation on Turkish soil boded little good for the future of the State. Kemal found it impos-

sible to rouse a spark of courage and defiance in the Sultan or in the Damad Ferid Government. He decided to go his own way. He obtained the post of Inspector-General in the interior, and on May 19th, 1919, he landed at Samsun.

CHAPTER VII

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

AT almost exactly the same time, the Greeks landed at Smyrna, ostensibly to police the area, actually to annex it to Greece. They landed with the connivance of the British and the French, who were anxious to prevent the Aegean coastline from falling to Italy, who, already in occupation of the Mediterranean coast round Antalya, claimed the Smyrna enclave under the unratified secret Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne. The Greek occupation was only one incident in the sordid history of the intrigues and appetites of the Allied Powers over the spoils of dismembered Turkey, but since Greece was not a Great Power, and was moreover a hated enemy, it is probable that the Greek landing did more than anything else to rouse the Turks to the peril and ignominy of their position.

For it must not be thought that when Mustafa Kemal turned his back on Istanbul, a frenzied people were waiting to claim him as leader and to throw off the foreign yoke. Quite the contrary. Even among nationalist circles he had yet to make his way. An "Anatolian Defence Rights Association" already existed in the interior. He had to prove himself to this body. But more difficult than the suspicions of the patriots was the dull apathy of the country at large. For centuries the people of Anatolia had been the down-trodden, neglected leavings of the Empire. No one had inspired them. No one called them to action. No one had bothered about them at all except to take their earnings and conscript their sons. Could they be made to feel the stirrings of national consciousness and national loyalty when neither nation nor

State nor Government could have any but unhappy associations for them? It is true that ever since 1908 devoted patriots had gone from village to village and the work of the "Turkish Hearth" had spread, but, since then, war, with its aftermath of weariness and disillusion, had intervened. The men, about 50 per cent. deserters, who were streaming back from the front wanted anything rather than further fighting. The mood of Istanbul, "It is better to submit than to bleed", was to a very great extent the mood of the wounded and exhausted country in the summer of 1919.

For the Turks, therefore, it was ultimately a fortunate stroke of fate that sent the Greek armies to Smyrna in 1919 and in the course of the next two years encouraged them to seek to expand their holding into the interior of Anatolia. The Greeks were so obviously conquerors, not police. Their behaviour was so patently provocative. Their advance brought them into immediate and violent conflict with peasants and soldiers for whom Anatolia was little more than a dream, but this village of Ushuq and that town of Eskeshehir inspired the solid patriotism of daily life. It was on the basis of their awakened national feelings that the Kemalist movement grew to strength in the next two years.

Mustafa Kemal did not immediately break with the Sultanate. He may still have hoped to win the Sultan as the figure-head of the nationalist movement. Besides, he did not as yet control the Defence Rights Association, and its leaders, some of whom were still at Istanbul, had not yet seen as clearly as he how radical the coming revolution would have to be. The Association held a first Conference at Erzerum in July 1919, followed by a further Conference at Sivas in September. As an outcome of these popular gatherings a National Pact was drawn up, which, while granting independence to non-Turkish nationalities, demanded the same independence and territorial integrity for the Turks, and the abolition

of any privileges which would undermine full national sovereignty. The support gained by this National Pact was sufficient to secure the resignation of the Damad Ferid Ministry. In the elections held in the same autumn the Nationalists received a majority. When the National Assembly met in Istanbul in January 1920 and immediately confirmed the National Pact, it still looked as though Istanbul and Ankara, where Kemal had set up his headquarters, might work together for the deliverance of Turkey. However, in March, with the connivance of the Sultan, who feared the Allies less than Kemal, Entente forces, most of them British, occupied Constantinople and deported forty leading Nationalists—including Ziya Gökalp—to Malta. With this, effective leadership in free Turkey passed to Mustafa Kemal at Ankara, and the struggle against the Sultan and the Allies at Constantinople and the Greeks at Smyrna merged into one.

On April 23rd, 1920, the first meeting of the National Assembly took place in Ankara. It laid down that the Sultan was a prisoner incapable of exercising his authority—as indeed he was—and that all power now resided in the Grand National Assembly. Next day Mustafa Kemal was chosen to be its President. These arrangements were at first looked on as provisional. There was no abrogation of former constitutions, no change of capital. Nevertheless, on April 30th, the Powers were notified that the Ankara Government was the real representative of the people.

In the early summer of 1920 Kemal faced desperate odds. The recruiting of his Turks was slow and uncertain. Defeat and demilitarization had deprived them of any effective armament. For the first year they had to rely on the arms they could capture by raiding Allied stores. Their capital, the Smyrna enclave; Antalya, and Cilicia were occupied. There was fighting with the Armenians on the Eastern frontier, and the Greeks steadily

conquered more territory all through the year, resisted only by irregulars and a couple of regiments operating from Balikeshir.

. Yet the Allied front which seemed so formidable in 1920 was destined to disintegrate rapidly as the victors of Versailles fell out over the division of the spoils. Italy had been outraged by Britain's backing of the Greeks. The Italian occupation of Antalya was always half-hearted, and when the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Sultan in the autumn of 1920, confirmed the Greeks in their possession of Smyrna, the Italians lost interest, and in 1921 they negotiated with Ankara and withdrew their troops. The French, equally put out by Britain's hesitations over sanctions against Germany in the West and her desire to support King Feisal at Damascus in the East, also turned to Ankara with a malicious pleasure in discomfiting their allies. The Ankara Accord—Mustafa Kemal's first treaty with a Western Power—was signed on October 20th, 1921. It covered the evacuation of Cilicia, provided for a special régime in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, to which the Turks would renounce none of their claims, and ended the state of war between France and Turkey. The French then withdrew to concentrate on keeping the British out of Syria, leaving behind several hundred thousand dollars worth of armaments as a discreet contribution to the further embarrassment of the British, whose bayonets were still attempting to uphold both the Sultan and the Treaty of Sèvres at Istanbul.

During these two critical years the position of the Ankara régime was also strengthened by the moral support of Soviet Russia. The Bolshevik régime was too actively engaged in its own civil war to give material assistance, but it was naturally ready to recognize a Government in roughly the same position as itself, fighting for recognition against a discredited régime within its own country and against the Allies without. A first

agreement was reached as early as August 1920, and on March 16th, 1921, a Treaty was signed at Moscow in which the two Governments gave each other mutual recognition, fixed their common frontier, and arranged for the regulation of their future commercial and financial relations.

The steady strengthening of the Ankara Government was not, however, wholly due to the disintegration of the Allied front. One of the reasons why the Italians and the French, and perhaps even the Russians, were prepared to negotiate with the Turks was because they had proved their staying power on the field of battle. The Greeks advanced through the autumn of 1920 without suffering reverses. These were anxious and energetic days for Mustafa Kemal and his right-hand man, Ismet Pasha—now President of the Republic. Kemal was everywhere—in Ankara rallying the despondents and the critics; at the front, trying to form a coherent line; in the villages, inspiring the recruiting drive; on the rough roads, organizing and encouraging the mule-drivers, the horsemen, the valiant peasant women whose work it was to bring up the guns and the food. The armament of the Nationalists was still hopelessly inadequate, their army was still a rabble of untrained recruits or war-weary veterans, they could still not rely upon the unquestioning loyalty of their officials. There was even an occasion when one Commander not only refused Kemal's authority, but set his troops to attack the Nationalist army.

Yet in January 1921 and again in March the Turks, led by Ismet Pasha, defeated the Greeks at İnönü. The Greeks then received more reinforcements, and more Allied encouragement and advanced on Ankara. The Turks were outnumbered, particularly in war material, and in this extremity Kemal was appointed Commander-in-Chief. He organized the defences of the Sakarya River, the last defensible line west of Ankara, and after



a struggle which raged for twenty-two days and twenty-two nights (August 23rd–September 13th, 1921) the Greeks were repulsed, and the decisive battle of the war was won.

The Turkish army was still hardly in a position to take the offensive. The next year was spent strengthening the armed forces, increasing the hold of the Ankara régime on the loyalty of the people and the hold of Kemal on the Ankara régime. His path was not altogether smooth. To the right were groups of religious fanatics as well as moderate conservatives, who supported him against the Allies, but would probably have broken with him at once could they have foreseen the full sweep of the reforms which were taking clearer and clearer shape in his mind. To the left were a few extremists associated in a loose Communist group. They were without much support from Russia, for the ground had been cut from under them by Kemal's agreement with the Bolsheviks, and they had no support at all in the country. To consolidate the centre, Kemal grouped his own followers into a Defence of Rights Group, which was the nucleus of the later Republican People's Party.

During this period of waiting the Allies drifted farther and farther apart, the Greeks grew demoralized both by inaction at the front and by the eclipse of Venizelos at home. At last, in August 1922, Kemal judged that the time had come to strike. Between August 26th, when Afyonkarahisar was captured, and September 9th, the Greeks were utterly routed and driven into the sea. Smyrna was hardly occupied when Kemal, determining to finish with the whole question of Allied occupation while the military impetus of the Greek victory still held, despatched a column of troops to Gallipoli, where an Allied garrison occupied Chanak. The French and Italian contingents immediately withdrew. The British forces were outnumbered, and the possibility of hostilities which would have been violently unpopular in Britain

forced the hand of the British Government. After some hesitation they signed the Armistice of Mudania on October 11th, and in the following year negotiated, again with some hesitation, the Treaty of Lausanne, which, signed on July 24th, 1923, completely nullified the Treaty of Sèvres, recognized the Ankara régime as the official Government the Sultan had in any case fled in November 1922., and conceded all the principles which had originally been laid down in the National Pact. The Treaty fixed the boundaries of Turkey claimed by the Nationalists, it recognized the abolition of capitulations, and ended the Graeco-Turkish conflict in the most conciliatory manner, Greece recognizing her obligation to pay indemnities, Turkey waiving them in view of Greece's bankrupt finances. Only in a few questions did Turkey not achieve her aims. The Straits were demilitarized, and an International Commission controlled shipping questions. The Sanjak of Alexandretta, though autonomous, remained under a French mandate. The eastern frontier with Iraq was still under dispute, and Italy remained in possession of the Dodecanese. Nevertheless, it is a monument to the work of Mustafa Kemal and to the resurgence of Turkey that of all the treaties ending the last war, the Treaty of Lausanne alone represented a genuinely negotiated peace. The Treaty was followed within a few weeks by unconditional recognition of the Ankara régime. This put the final touch of consolidation to Mustafa Kemal's international position.

At home, his status was clarified by the election of a new National Assembly. His Defence Rights Group had in the winter of 1922 been extended into a People's Party, and Kemal spent several months touring the country, visiting small villages, questioning peasants and officials alike, and establishing some sort of link between himself and the people he was to govern. After the elections, at which the overwhelming majority of candidates were of the People's Party, some of the



V. MUHAMMADANISM AND MODERNISM

1. A MOSQUE IN ISTANBUL (*Black Star*)

2. AN ARCADE IN ANKARA AND STATUE OF ATATÜRK (*Keystone Press*)

D (W)

older and more conservative Ministers of the earlier Cabinet resigned. The path was clear for Kemal. He had the mandate of the people, and the prestige of Lausanne behind him. On October 29th, 1923, Turkey was proclaimed a Republic and Mustafa Kemal elected by the Assembly to be its first President.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

MUSTAFA KEMAL was now in the prime of life and in the possession of almost unlimited power. He was in no doubt about his aims for Turkey, whose fate was now in his hands. The new Republic would be adapted, by means of wholesale westernization and with the utmost speed the community could stand, to "the strenuous conditions of modern life". The process of westernizing Turkey meant a thorough overhaul and modernization of all existing institutions, the abolition of many of them, the creation of new ones, and a radical transformation of the temper of the people. It is important to understand from the start what Mustafa Kemal meant by "westernization" and "modernization". His training and mental formation belonged to the period of Liberal enlightenment. He believed in the inalienable right of the nation to lead a completely independent and sovereign existence. He believed in the rights of men, in the equality of citizens before the law, and in the State as an association to serve their common well-being. He believed that reason and scientific method could create an almost unlimited future of material progress for mankind, that the Western world, through science and industrialism, had discovered the key to this progress, and that if Turkey were to benefit from it, then the Turks, too, would have to apply rational and scientific methods to every sphere of their national life. He believed that "unrational" beliefs—which virtually meant processes of thought not amenable to scientific proof—were in almost every case hostile to his ideal of progress. To this rule his acceptance of nationalism, his

faith in the Turks and their fanatical faith in him were obvious, uncritical exceptions. The turn of his mind was profoundly secular, if not to say anti-religious. His private life was completely amoral. He was not interested in personal ethics. The only aspect of personal behaviour with which he ever appears to have been concerned was loyalty or lack of it to the Turkish Revolution.

When, in 1935, his People's Party (or Republican People's Party, as it became on the setting up of the Republic) published a revised and lengthened programme as a guide to its future activities, it proclaimed six principles to be the guiding tenets of Turkey's national faith. These principles are the six arrows which, set against a red background, are the symbol of the Party. "Turkey", the programme stated "is republican, nationalist, populist (dependent upon popular sovereignty), state socialist (or, better, *étatist*), secular (lay) and revolutionary". The phrasing is that of the programme, the thought is essentially Mustafa Kemal's, and sums up in six words the faith, backed by titanic will-power, restless energy, and a personal magnetism which few could withstand, with which Mustafa Kemal set to work to transform the Turkish community. At the time of his death, fifteen years later, there was not a sphere of the community's life that had not been revolutionized by the impact of his personality and his ideas.

Kemal found certain elements of the future political structure of the State already in being. The Constitution of 1876 (Midhat Pasha's Constitution) was parliamentary, from 1908 onwards the forms of Western constitutional government had been aped by the Committee of Union and Progress, and the Committee itself was a species of embryonic party. The Constitution of republican Turkey developed and expanded in a democratic sense the earlier efforts. Legislative and executive power are vested in the National Assembly, legislative power directly, executive power indirectly, through the

President and his Ministers. The National Assembly is a single chamber of deputies elected indirectly by universal suffrage, to which women were admitted in 1934, when the minimum age for voting was changed from eighteen to twenty-one. The President is elected by the National Assembly for its own term of existence, four years. He is Commander of the Army, chooses the Prime Minister,⁹ promulgates the laws passed by the Assembly, in whose discussion he does not take part, and has a certain suspensory veto on laws. However, the Assembly, after reconsideration, can carry them through.

The National Assembly, or *Kamutay*, meets once a year, whether the President summons it or not. It is usually in session for six months, and the annual Budget must be placed before it at the opening of the session. The Prime Minister chooses his Cabinet, sixteen in number, from the Assembly; each member is attached to one of the permanent Commissions (for Agriculture, for the Budget, for Public Works, etc.), where he enjoys full voting rights. Membership of the Assembly is considered a sufficiently onerous and full-time occupation to disqualify the deputies from holding any other Government post. Two months' absence from the Assembly without proper excuse entails resignation.

The elections are organized by the single Republican People's Party. The people elect—under the guidance of the Party—a number of "electors". It is their task to elect the actual deputies. The candidates at this stage are chosen by the Party; nearly all of them are party-members, with a few others chosen for some technical skill or special knowledge (in 1939, 424 out of 429 deputies belonged to the Party). Several of these candidates stand for each constituency, and one of them is elected deputy by the "electors".

Local government is linked to the electoral system, for the "electors" also choose the representative council which works with the Governor of each province. These

Governors (or *Valis*) are appointed by the central Government, and are assisted by a council of officials—inspectors, engineers, and civil administrators—as well as by the elected council. There are sixty-three provinces (or *vilayets*), and they are divided into districts (*kaza*), which in their turn are composed of communes. The communes are divided into villages or city-wards, and this is the fundamental unit of local government. It is here, too, that the Kemalists found something to work on. In Ottoman times the attention of the central Government to local affairs was largely confined to the collection of taxes. In pure self-defence, the village had to undertake the provision of some of its own services, and the result was a spontaneous village council under a responsible and respected headman (or *muhtar*). These village councils have been preserved as the basic units of Turkish country life. They are encouraged to carry on their tradition of making good the deficiencies of the central Government. These are naturally not so vast as formerly, but only those who have travelled in Turkey can realize the primitive state of the countryside and the incredible isolation of thousands of small villages tucked away in the folds of the upland steppes. They must still repair their roads and see to their water supply. The new régime has encouraged them, too, to build their own school-houses, since the expense of providing teachers is all that the educational Budget can cover in many rural areas.

The village is also the basic unit of the People's Party. The elective hierarchy follows in a sort of soviet system the hierarchy of local government, although it is separate from it. Representatives of the local groups go to the Committee for the Commune, which in its turn sends representatives to the provincial committee. Every four years there is a national Congress at Ankara.

These, then, are the bare bones of the Turkish political system as it was established by Mustafa Kemal and

as it functions to-day; but the framework gives a very inadequate idea of its real working. Behind the façade of Assembly, deputies, electors, party organization, there was for fifteen years the inescapable fact that Mustafa Kemal (or Kemal Atatürk, as he was later and more generally known) inspired all the reforms, directed and determined all the policy, followed its execution, often to the smallest detail, and exercised a power as absolute as any of the dictators of the West. It is true that he consulted the Assembly and the laws were enacted in its name. It is true that he was at pains to remain in constant personal contact with the people, walking and talking with them, arriving unexpectedly in their villages, questioning them closely on their needs, and testing their reactions to new steps in his policy. But, for all that, it was a question of timing, rather than of any modification in the direction of policy. He did not wish to push reform beyond the point at which a majority of the more educated classes on the one hand, or deeply grounded local opposition on the other, might refuse to budge. He was prepared to wait for the necessary process of education to do its work. But in the last analysis his fiat was law, and his governing was done without reference to the will of any other man or body of men within the Republic.

So, too, in the provinces, the elaborate organization of local government covered, and still covers, the fact that efficiency and progress are very largely dependent on the personality of the Governor. Anyone who has visited the province of Smyrna, where General Kazim Dirik was *Vali* from 1925 to 1935, will probably have noticed the unusually high standard of development in all branches of local government. It is true that Smyrna is a richer province than most, but other Governors with comparable resources have accomplished only half as much. New schools—the province has the highest proportion of village schools to villages—reading-rooms,

better roads, public gardens, sports clubs are all evidence of the Governor's activity, and in the years after his transfer to the Governorship of Thrace, to every query, the answer was: "Kazim Dirik did it". And now he is said to be making an equally sound job of Thrace.

The overwhelming importance of leadership is not, of course, incompatible with a democratic system. One of the weaknesses of that system in the parliamentary West has probably been an excessive fear of it, and the exclusion on that account of vigorous personalities from party life. It is more difficult to reconcile the existence of a single party with the traditional Western view of democracy. The rôle of the single party in Russia, Germany, and Italy makes it inevitably suspect to the supporters of free institutions. It must be remembered, however, that in Turkey the Constitution guarantees the traditional "rights of man" to the citizen. He is equal before the law. His life and liberty may not be taken away save by due process of law. He has the right to freedom of conscience, speech, and association. And within limits—for example, a ban on all associations "with the purpose of propagating ideas of class distinction or class conflict" or "with internationalist intentions" and the very real restrictions on the Press's freedom of comment—within these limits, the traditional liberties are in fact preserved. There is nothing to correspond to the Gestapo or Ogpu, to forced labour or the concentration camp. Nor is terrorism one of the weapons of the single Party; propaganda, yes, but compulsion by means of physical violence is unknown. Even to the most superficial observer, Turkey is obviously not "totalitarian". The question is, however, whether the Republic can be genuinely called free.

The truth is, perhaps, that Turkey is a community in which the citizens are being forced to be free. This explains most of the contradictions—the democratic dictator, the single but untotalitarian party, the coexist-

ence of absolute government and representation. The men of 1919, above all Atatürk himself, were still in the unclouded tradition of 1789, but they had to apply a nineteenth-century faith to twentieth-century conditions. To do so they preserved the ideal and changed the methods. They had moreover to graft this faith—in freedom, the people, the sovereign national state, science, reason, and progress—on to a community which was almost totally unfitted to receive it. So, once again, the average Turk had to be compelled to be reasonable and progressive—and free.

These reformers had, after all, to break with the traditions of centuries when they set out to build a modern Republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Apart from a very small class of educated men, the people were roughly composed, on the one hand of an entrenched clerical class, whose position depended on the preservation of an outworn religio-social system in which it was not the worship of God that was discredited, but the growth, like an ugly fungus all over Turkish life, of Islamic customs and laws. These, like the tithing of mint and cummin, had a ceremonial and finally a superstitious significance, and were as many obstacles to the adoption of a rational and healthy code of civil life. On the other, there was the mass of the peasants. They had lived from the dawn of history under a succession of despotisms in which the Sovereign had been "the shadow of God", and in which the creative rôle of the free citizen was not even a dream behind a dream. The fatalistic attitude of Islam reinforced their traditional passivity as the slaves of the State. Centuries of oppression had inured them to racking poverty and periodic wars, which they accepted without complaint. The gaunt hills and barren soil taught them to expect little from Nature and to believe that no changes in technique could ever for long outwit her unchanging infertility. These were the men who were to be persuaded to speak, to vote, to act, to

reform their agriculture, to educate their sons. Clearly, it could not be thought of as a process coming from them. There was no popular demand for change. The advantages of change had, on the contrary, to be demonstrated again and again and again to a doubting people. For this reason, the first task of the political machine was not to reflect opinion, but to create it.

Atatürk himself attempted to meet the critics by pointing out that the single Party represented the fact that there existed a genuine unity of need and purpose in the Turkish State. "The interests of the different Groups", he said at one of his meetings, "can be reconciled perfectly, and there are no means of dividing them into classes. All our citizens enter into the group which we call the People. Thus the People's Party will be a school of education in citizenship for our people." This unity is very largely a fact. There are, for example, no national difficulties such as destroyed all attempts at parliamentary democracy in Austria-Hungary before 1914, or in the Ottoman Empire, too, for that matter. There are no racial and religious splits, such as present the democratic development of India with such insuperable difficulties. There are, on the whole, no great cleavages of class. This does not mean that there are not differences of wealth and poverty. Between the Minister at Ankara and his wife who buys her gowns from Paquin, and poor Mehmet who farms two acres of stony ground on the hills outside the city, the gulf is as great as any in Western Europe. But there are very few very rich men in Turkey, the bureaucracy is still comparatively small, the industrial workers an insignificant fraction of the population of whom over 80 per cent. are still peasants. The ladders of education are open to any boys of talent in the towns and more accessible villages, and success stories—of the "Log Cabin to White House" type—are everywhere evidence that in Turkey the "frontier"

is not yet closed. In this undifferentiated community the need for different parties hardly arises, so the Turks maintain.

Here they are touching on a sore and unresolved problem in modern democratic life. The reason why the Turks can preserve their freedom under a single-party system is because they enjoy a fundamental unity of social purpose. It is generally admitted that where, in the West, a party split represents a fundamental cleavage in the social life of the community (for example, the unbridgeable division between Communist Left and Conservative Right in France), a party system, or indeed any system of democracy, tends to become unworkable. Does it follow that the Turks are offering a new experiment in democracy: a single party which creates freedom by creating unity? It is worth considering, but, obviously, it is not as simple as that. Turkish unity comes in part from the common social purpose of the community—that of creating a prosperous, modernized, nationalist republic—but equally it comes from the fact that most of the problems of the more highly industrialized States of the West still lie before the Turks.

Besides, if the dangers of the two-or-more party State are social disintegration, faction, party interest, and the rest, there are different dangers in the single party: the apathy and arrogance a monopoly always tends to breed, a growing indifference to the genuine needs of the people, the creation of a caste of party bureaucrats, riddled with nepotism and developing locally into a most unhealthy boss system. Atatürk was alive to the dangers of monopoly; indeed, in 1931 he attempted to organize a two-party system and called on Fethi Bey to set up a second party: the Liberal Party of the Republic. The fact that it immediately gathered to itself not the Liberals but the rabidly reactionary elements in Turkish life, and led within a few weeks to violence and street-fight-

ing, caused its early suppression. The point is that if Atatürk felt the need of this striking modification, it cannot be said that the Turkish system has necessarily solved the problem of free government in the complex, interdependent, industrialized community of the twentieth century. A further experiment inaugurated in 1939, of an opposition group of twenty-one Party members *within the party*, is interesting perhaps for securing concentrated criticism, but it is no alternative to the technique of renewing leadership and securing by regular elections a genuine verdict on the results of government which has been of the essence of free party government in the West.

It is perhaps too early to judge whether Atatürk set up a system to outlast him. His successor, President İsmet İnönü, is a great statesman and administrator; there has been no change in policy. Industrialization, education, the development of agriculture are continuing along the lines laid down by Atatürk. But in a system which depended to so overwhelming an extent on the personality of one man, it is questionable whether the same energy and drive and initiative can run through the state. There have been certain traces of a slackening of effort. Firms working in Turkey complain of the time taken to secure the ratification of contracts and the delay of bureaucratic methods, all of which have increased since the death of Atatürk. It is difficult to judge without a very detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the administration, but it may perhaps be surmised that the bureaucratic tendencies of a single-party system are held in check by the energy and direction of an outstanding leader such as Atatürk, but that under less gifted men the inherent defects of the system are more apparent. Turkey has not therefore solved the problem of free government in a planned economy. On the other hand, neither the system nor the ideas behind it are so rigid that new developments and new adaptations

cannot force themselves through. Everything depends on the new generation of civil servants, scientists and professional men who are growing up in the schools and universities. If Atatürk's revolution has bred new men, then it will survive him.

CHAPTER IX

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION

A REVOLUTION cannot be judged simply by measuring its political content. The régime may change. Sovereigns come and go. Even the constitutional forms of government can be modified without the life of the community showing any very marked result. It was the difficulty of achieving any really profound socio-economic changes in Turkish life that frustrated the efforts at political reform first of Midhat Pasha and later of the Young Turks. In the Kemalist revolution the adoption of a Constitution and the introduction of a representative elective system have been the surface or crown of changes which go to the very basis of national life. It was possible to destroy Midhat's work by destroying his Constitution. If the whole political superstructure of Turkey were changed to-morrow, not more than a fraction of Atatürk's work would be undone.

The complete secularization of Turkish society has caused most of the profound changes in the country's *ethos*—inevitably since the religious beliefs of a society are concerned with the deepest and strongest emotions and most critical events in men's lives. Until the twentieth century a large part of Turkish civil law—the laws affecting inheritance and property and the family—was based on the Koran, and the *Seriat*, or Holy Law, was administered by the religious authorities. Such an intertwining of religious and civil life disappeared from the life of Western Europe after the Reformation and only vestiges of it remain, such as the linking of Probate and Divorce, a reminder of the time when wills and marriages were the affair of the Church. It can be imagined

that the decision to separate Islam from the civic life of the community, and thus to abolish in a decade a system which had taken centuries and revolutions to disappear in Europe, was one of the most radical Atatürk felt called to take, and it is significant that it was on this issue that his revolution aroused most opposition and fanaticism. The series of revolts by the Kurds were largely directed against the process of secularization. The opposition which gathered round Fethi Bey in 1931 was drawn from the ranks of the religious conservatives. Nevertheless, the process was easier than might have been expected. The Turks were never a notably religious people. They did not produce the mystics, the philosophers or the poets of Islam. They were for long the Sword-arm of the Prophet, the soldiers, the watchdogs, and Islam was in the first place a weapon of conquest and a means of controlling the peoples who were conquered. In internal affairs Islam was not so much a personal faith and ethic for living as a traditional social code, which, as time passed and conditions changed, became more and more out of touch with the realities of modern life and thought.

To the Kemalist revolution, neither externally nor internally was Islam anything but an inconvenience. Externally it continued to link independent nationalist Turkey with the world of Islam, which had until recently been the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The preservation of Islam might revive dreams of Empire, against which Atatürk's policy was resolutely set. It might create awkward foreign entanglements. It might weaken the overpowering loyalty to the national State which was the emotional dynamic behind the whole Kemalist experiment. Accordingly, the Khalifate—the office of spiritual leadership over all Islam which the Ottoman Sultan had long combined with his secular powers—was abolished in 1924, a year or so after the

abolition of the Sultanate. With its disappearance, Turkey's link with world-Islam was officially broken.

The task of disentangling the religious and civil life of the community was undertaken at the same time. The Ministries of Religious Affairs and of the *Seriat* (Holy Law), with their jurisdiction over religious colleges, tribunals, trusts, benevolent institutions and the rest, were abolished with the Khalifate, and authority was then transferred to the Ministry of Justice and other appropriate bodies. All Moslem schools—these were the great majority of the schools in the Ottoman Empire—went at the same time, and the whole educational system was brought under the control of a lay Ministry of Education. The right to wear religious dress was confined to those who held office at the mosque, and later, in 1935, the ban on appearing publicly in religious garb was extended to all clergy—a ban which affected the missionaries serving the Christian minorities as well.

These moves towards secularization influenced many of the externals of Turkish life considerably. For example, the campaign initiated personally by Atatürk in 1925 to press on the adoption of Western clothes was part of the general process of secularizing Turkish society. Significantly, Atatürk chose the little town of Kastamonu, in the interior, known for its religious and conservative atmosphere, to launch the drive for Westernized clothes. Here on August 24th, 1925, he threw away his *fez*—the small red hat shaped like a flower-pot, traditional headgear of the Moslem—and put on an ordinary hat. Three months later the *fez* was abolished by law.

The *fez* was virtually the only article of apparel to be changed among the men, since the educated classes had adopted Western clothes earlier, and the country men wore the odd, patchwork garments which are indistinguishable from peasantry to peasantry. The change to Western clothes demanded much more far-reaching

changes in women's dress. The traditional dress of baggy trousers and richly embroidered tunic was, it is true, going out, although peasant women continued—and continue still—to wear trousers: tight trousers clipped in at the ankles as though with bicycle clips. But the veil persisted, covering the face below the eyes, and, in strict families, made of opaque, black material. Atatürk, with a certain finesse, refrained from legislating directly for the veil. It was left to the women to make their choice. Besides, the question of veiling was only a very small, though highly symbolic, side issue in the whole question of the emancipation of women, where, again with the realization that he was treading on ground mined with fanaticism and conservative opposition, Atatürk preferred to proceed indirectly.

The status of women—their marriage, their powers of inheritance, their relation to their children—was largely governed by the *Seriat*. It was they who were most concerned with its abolition. And it was by replacing this “Holy Law” by the Swiss Civil Code¹ that Atatürk, without directly legislating for women, revolutionized their position. Under the new code, adopted in 1926, polygamy was illegal, marriage was a civil ceremony, women secured equal rights of property-holding and independence of inheritance, and could become legal guardians. In the course of the following decade the Government demonstrated clearly that it did not intend this new status to exist only on paper. Women secured the right to vote and be elected in municipal elections in 1930, and in national elections four years later. In the 1935 elections seventeen women were duly elected. More important than these political rights were the new economic

¹ The abolition of the *Seriat* and the “rights” guaranteed under the new Constitution made a complete reorganization of Turkey's legal system inevitable. This was done by adopting the following codes: the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code, the German Commercial Code, and the Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Neuchâtel.



VI. FOOD AND WATER

(Exclusive News Agency)

1. THRESHING GRAIN

2. CUBUK DAM

and social opportunities. There are to-day no posts in civil life which women may not enter. Women are to be found in all the professions, in workshops and factories and shops. And in every walk of life there is equal pay for equal work. For the peasant woman, who has always enjoyed greater independence, by reason of doing a lion's share of the work, the new status has affected the situation to a much less marked extent. The gradual disappearance of polygamy, with its reduction of the farm's female labour force, may, however, compel the husband to devote more of his time to working the farm and less to smoking at the local coffee-house.

The woman in the West may find it difficult to realize the significance of the new position enjoyed by Turkish women. This is particularly true of the second and third generation in the emancipated West. For one thing, they have grown used to the acceptance of their work and companionship. For another, neither the women who worked for emancipation nor their granddaughters who enjoy it have much conception of the degradation suffered by women under polygamy, where life is limited to the quarrels and intrigues of the seraglio. For women to have broken with this in little more than a decade, and to have become almost at ease in the new conditions, is perhaps the greatest of the revolutions in modern Turkey.

Such a change would not, of course, have been possible if the emancipation had not been accompanied by a radical transformation of the educational system. Here again the point of departure was the secularization of the State. The old educational system was broken up by the abolition of religious schools—save those of the minorities. In their place, with the exception of a few private schools under the control of the Ministry of Education, a system of State education has been built up, free, compulsory, and secular. At the basis of the system is the elementary school, which all children are supposed to

attend from seven to twelve. In fact, the period is often only three years, and the 800,000 children in the Government elementary schools represent only 53 per cent. of the children of the Republic.

A single journey across the central plateau explains why the educational facilities are still inadequate. Until the Revolution, few of these scattered villages had schoolhouses at all. Even now the village has often to provide the school building from local stone, free time, and voluntary labour. Where there is no schoolhouse, impassable roads and long distances may cut the child off from the nearest centre. Again, a body of teachers adequate to the needs of 18 millions cannot be created in two decades. This difficulty is partly met by the system of itinerant teachers. A youth just down from the University—part of his covenant with the State is to teach for a certain period in return for free education—will be centred on one village. He will teach there two days a week. The other four are spent in two other villages in a twenty-mile radius, to which he may ride across muddy tracks and open fields. The schoolhouses in which he teaches are usually a single room. There children of every grade must learn together. They do learn the alphabet. They can read a little, and count. If a visitor comes to the village, they may be able to scrawl, with red cheeks and tongue stuck out, a greeting in Turkish characters on the blackboard or in the sand outside the schoolhouse door. But their chances of moving on to the lycées or to the vocational schools are not great.

In the larger towns elementary schools are equipped according to completely Western standards. So, too, are the lycées, in which the children in their 'teens prepare for the University or the vocational schools where girls and boys learn trades and crafts. Higher education has been developed rather than primary schooling—and rightly so for the State needs civil servants, engineers, doctors, teachers. It has to create its *élite* before going

out to the masses. The University at Istanbul, an old religious foundation, was completely reorganized in 1933, and at Ankara a University is in process of construction. The faculties of law, medicine, and history are already established. Besides the Universities, there are other specialist higher schools: the Institute of Education, for example, the Agricultural Institute, and the very important School for Political Sciences, through which most aspirants to high office in the Civil Service must pass.

Most of these schools are at Ankara, and it is here that the visitor finds the most striking examples of Turkey's modern architecture. The schools are designed according to functional principles, and little attempt has been made to work out a Turkish variant of the universal theme of straight lines, light walls, flat roofs, and wide windows. This is perhaps just as well, for where the attempt has been made, it is fussy, pretentious and unconvincing. Inside, the classrooms are light and white, the corridors wide, the design simple and restful. It is true that they might be anywhere in the world—from Los Angeles to Singapore. Nevertheless, Ankara is an arresting city. It has grown up in a decade from the citadel of crumbling stone houses, "a cloud of dust beside the railway line", to its appearance to-day, which is for all the world that of an international exhibition, with the new Ministries as Palaces of Industry, Art, or Engineering, and the Embassies and Legations on the long hill leading to Atatürk's villa as the "French Pavilion", the "British Pavilion", the "United States Pavilion", and so on. The illusion is increased by the fact that one or two foreign Powers have built their Embassies in a modified version of their own national architecture. Colonial Dutch marches with neo-Italian.

The process of educating the Turks could not have advanced at so promising a speed had not Atatürk taken the decision to reform the alphabet. Until 1928 the

Turks used Arabic script, which had been somewhat modified to reproduce the Turkish tongue. This script was beautiful, and, to those who knew it well, convenient, for it was in fact a kind of shorthand. (Even to-day, over ten years after the reform, it is possible to see business men or civil servants making rapid notes in the beautiful old fluid script.) But it is very difficult to learn, and it condemned a large section of the Turkish people to perpetual illiteracy. Moreover, it was a link with Turkey's Islamic, imperial past. Both to end illiteracy and to wipe out this past, Atatürk secured the adoption of the Latin alphabet in November 1928. Folk-schools were set up all over the country, and more than a million men and women set to work to master the new alphabet. In the autumn of 1929 teaching was everywhere begun in the new script. Papers, books, notices appeared in it. Atatürk himself tramped the country, setting up his blackboard in village squares and lecturing the villagers on the script. In the decade that has followed, the new alphabet has become thoroughly assimilated.

Among the adult population the speed of the assimilation is largely due to the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) which now exist in all the *vilayets* and in most towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants. These houses, which are usually run by the People's Party, are centres for education and for propaganda. They organize lectures—on literature and folklore and geography and history—entertainments, patriotic rallies. They provide newspapers and books, and give opportunities for listening-in—an important service in a community in which there are only about 10,000 wireless sets licensed. To some extent they take the place of the more mechanical entertainments in the West. There are perhaps 200 cinemas in all Turkey, a high percentage of them in Istanbul and Smyrna. The *Halkevleri* show propaganda and educational films, for most of them possess cinema equipment but the People's Party relies far more on personal

contact and direct instruction. The regular tours of governors and deputies are a feature of the political link between Government and governed—another example of the way in which Atatürk, this time with his black-board and stump oratory, set the pace.

Empire has gone. Islam has gone. What do schools and People's Houses and Party and Press put in their place? They are the instruments by which the social unity of Turkish society is to be secured. They are the only guarantees that the Kemalist experiment will be more than a phenomenon of Atatürk's own life-time. It is through these channels that the Republic will grow—or not at all. The end of education and propaganda and Press is, broadly, to produce "republican, nationalist, populist, étatist, lay, and revolutionary" citizens. In other words, the *ethos* of the community is to be that of Atatürk himself. Of these principles, incomparably the most important is nationalism. The teaching of history and geography is intensely nationalist. The cult of the Turkish race is extolled at every turn. The bulk of the teaching must be in Turkish by Turkish teachers out of Turkish text-books. The greatness of the Republic is laid down as the goal of every citizen. Self-dedication to the Republic is the highest form of service. In the words of the Programme of the People's Party, "Education must be high, national and patriotic and far removed from all sorts of superstition and foreign ideas."

Is it successful? Is the adventure of building a new community, the *élan* of serving the national cause, enough? For the time being the answer is most certainly: yes. The sloughing-off of empire and the creation of a purely Turkish myth, coupled with the building of a modernized Republic, have obviously delivered the people of Turkey from the almost unlimited frustration of the Ottoman Empire, and launched a great wave of creative energy. For the rest, it is too early to judge whether the almost total extent to which the

revolution was personified in Atatürk will cause a dangerous reaction.

Two things must be said about this nationalism and modernism. The nationalism is not a persecuting nationalism. The Turks have no claims on their neighbours and no hostility for their minorities (provided they are quiet). The school books contain no hate propaganda. Again, the modernism and secularism, though they aim at producing a rational scientific outlook, are not positively and aggressively atheist. A parent is perfectly at liberty to give his child a religious upbringing. Many of them do. There is no tabu on the practice of religion by State officials. The new President, İsmet İnönü, has the reputation of being a religious man. He has at least restored army chaplains to the army. There are no anti-God museums, no propaganda drives, no persecution. The Turks are, on the whole, a practical and materialist race. A secular plan probably moves them more readily than a mystical ideal. For all that, there are signs among some of the more experienced officials of a certain anxiety. Will nationalism in itself provide a personal ethic or personal standards of behaviour? These men remember that Ziya Gökalp pleaded for the preservation of Islam, of an Islam freed from its imperial and social entanglements and restored as a religion of the spirit. There was nothing in this for Atatürk; but now that he is dead there are some who wonder after all if "patriotism is enough".

However religious the fervour of Turkey's patriotism—and no one will deny its religious force—will it, when the Republic is older and more fully developed, still provide the necessary *élan*?

CHAPTER X

THE VILLAGE

THE changes brought about in Turkey's economic life by the Kemalist revolution are profound but unequal. In all rapidly industrializing countries it is the peasantry that bears the weight of the capital development of their country. The decline of British farming in the late nineteenth century, the miserable plight of the American farmers between the two wars, the fate of the Kulaks in Russia, the ferment and unrest among the peasants of Japan, are all symptoms of the same sacrifice—the sacrifice of the country to the town. The book on the origin of the wealth of nations is yet to be written. When it is, one section at least should attempt to assess the amount of “saving” that has been wrung from the land to provide the basis of industrialization. It is not only a question of taxation—wealth taken from the agricultural section of the community and re-invested not in rural improvement but in industrial capital; there is also the “saving”—sacrifice would be a better term—of the peasants first drafted into the factories, who in every community, from Yokohama to Pittsburgh, have been among the worst-paid, worst-treated, worst-exploited workers on the face of the earth.

Turkey is no exception to what seems to be a general rule of industrial development. Although agricultural output and conditions have improved, the striking economic advance has been in the sphere of industry, and the extent to which the life of the Turkish peasant is still cramped, poverty-stricken, and debt-laden is largely due to the industrial ambitions of the young Republic. The Five-Year Plans for industry have overshadowed the

needs of the peasants—even though 80 per cent. of the Turkish people still depend on the land for their livelihood. It follows that the village is to some extent the element in the Turkish community that has changed least in the last twenty years. The division of land, methods of cultivation, taxation, and marketing, though modified, have not been revolutionized as have other spheres of Turkish life. One of the biggest changes—the disestablishment of Islam and the secularization of society—meant for the peasants of the first generation of the revolution little more than that the State replaced the Church as landlord on the not inconsiderable Church estates, and that the tithe, one of the most tiresome of the Ottoman burdens, was abolished—to make room for land taxes, sheep taxes, cattle taxes, and profit taxes, which amounted to a not very much less onerous load.

There were very few big landowners when the Republic was set up. Their estates are largely to be found in the south, where the large-scale production of single crops such as cotton is concentrated, and their number has not been much diminished. But the supply of free land is not the Government's problem. There are Church lands and State lands and hitherto uncultivated lands all available for free distribution. It is a commentary on the possibly exaggerated attention paid to industry that only about two million acres have been distributed, and, on a rough estimate, something like half the peasants are still without land.

The average holdings vary, according to district. The habit of dividing land between the children on the death of their father has led to a wasteful extension of the strip system, with the land of one owner scattered in small, uneconomic units over the village. In the west the bulk of Turkey's fruit and nuts and tobacco is produced on quite small holdings—8 and 10 acres—of very good land. In the south the cotton crop is mainly in the hands of large landowners with estates of anything up to 2,000



VII. FURNACE BENCH, AND LOOM

1. BRITISH-BUILT STEEL WORKS, KARABUK
(*Exclusive News Agency*)

2. MAKING PEASANT FURNITURE
(*Wide World*)

3. CARPET WEAVING
(*Black Star*)



acres. The peasants work on them as share-croppers, and supplement their earnings by working in neighbouring cotton factories. Although these conditions are not typical of Turkey as a whole—the independent small-holder is the dominant type—it is worth while remarking that cotton is rapidly overhauling tobacco as Turkey's chief export.

In the east another variation from the norm of Turkish agriculture is the survival among the Kurds and frontier Turks of a purely pastoral and nomadic way of life. The movement to the hills in the summer and back to the valleys in the winter in the region behind Diyarbakir and beyond Lake Van is still a question of the uprooting of the whole village and the migration of the community in the wake of the herds. The Government is endeavouring, by village building and the development of agriculture, to put an end to the cycle, or rather, to reduce it to the scale of the Alpine migration, where the cattle move, but the village is static. Their efforts have had much to do with the fires of revolt which have flared up every year or so since the Republic was set up.

A great majority of the villages in Turkey still look as they looked before the coming of Atatürk. In the interior the huts are low, of stone or dried mud. They usually surround an open space—it can hardly be dignified by the name of square—where generations of peasants have stamped the earth flat. In wet weather it is covered by a greasy coating of mud. In high summer the dust blows up with every gust. Through it, picking, scraping, and grunting, rove domestic animals. There is usually a well, but almost no sanitation. In some of the remotest villages there are not even trees. All round are the upland steppes, part grazing ground, part wide, unfenced stretches of grain—barley, maize, and fine, hard wheat. Towards the coast the huts often change to small wooden houses, the paths between the houses are paved and have gutters. The hinterland is variegated—like an

Italian valley with small-holdings and vineyards and olive groves. In the village, too, there are trees and gardens, and perhaps a market square where the peasant women sell fruits and nuts and vegetables, squatting in their drab clothes and black shawls behind loaded baskets, while the men sit under the trees and smoke and drink coffee, and drink coffee and smoke.

But because the countryside has changed less rapidly than the other aspects of Turkish life—which have, after all, changed with breakneck speed—it would be quite false to assume either that there had been no changes, or that the Government was neglecting the problems of four-fifths of its citizens. It is in the country that traditions and customs die hardest, and everything in the Turkish peasant's past has conspired to give him a mixture of passivity and conservatism, which probably cannot be eradicated in the lifetime of one man. The Turkish authorities can hope that the children who have for the first time learnt to read and write, and the *élite* who for the first time have attended an agricultural college and seen what scientific methods can do for farming, will move more quickly than their fathers. The most revolutionary thing in each village is therefore the little white-washed schoolhouse where both the children and their elders are learning to read and write. And year by year the number of villages without a schoolhouse is being reduced.

Apart from general education, the Republic is responsible for a variety of direct agricultural improvements. These cover means of showing the peasant how to make the best use of his land, and enabling him to do so both as an individual cultivator and as the member of a collective village community. If there has been any general direction in these plans, it has been towards the growth of co-operation, in order to rescue the farmer from the poverty to which isolation and insufficient resources condemn him. The direction is not an ideo-

logical one. There is no official attitude, negative or positive, to property and ownership as such. There is no "myth" of collectivization—indeed, no myth at all, except the general nationalist, progressive drive of the Republic, with its emphasis on getting the job done by whatever method best fits the circumstances. The obvious collective trend in Turkish agriculture is a straightforward reflexion of the fact that the Turkish peasant will do better if he co-operates with his neighbours.

The method of educating the farmer in better ploughing, better planting, and better stock-raising has had to be visual and practical. Charts, figures, and percentages mean nothing to a man who can barely read. The valuable work is done in the various experimental stations set up by the Government in different parts of the country. These stations train demonstrators and produce the improved quality of seed or the better strain of livestock with which the demonstrators go to work. These men tour the country, planting exhibition fields with tested seed, or crossing the local farm animals with the Government's bloodstock. It is when the peasant sees the better grain, the better milk, the better meat that he will consent to adopt the same methods—not before.

The Agricultural Institute at Ankara can meet only a fraction of the need for demonstrators. The authorities have therefore supplemented the system by taking some of the most reliable N.C.O.'s in the army at the end of their period of service to train them in simple methods of village hygiene and agricultural improvement. For about three months they learn how to care for a herd, to keep chickens and goats, to tend a kitchen garden, to plant, prune, and graft fruit-trees, and to build walls and dig wells. Then they are sent back to the village from which they were called up, and, since they are local inhabitants, their example does wonders with the people among whom they have grown up. In many villages

they are the great standby of the schoolmaster. In many more, they become head man.

The encouragement of co-operative credit societies is an important item in the programme for co-operation in agriculture. There are between 600 and 700 of these societies, and their operations are backed by the Agricultural Bank, one of the soundest financial institutions of the Republic. The most recent development in collectivization is the delimitation during the summer of 1940 of four zones, each containing about 5,000 villages. Each zone has fifty tractors attached to it, and threshers and reapers are to be added later to these *combinats*. It is reckoned that the effect of modernized ploughing and of the general introduction of autumn sowing may double and treble the grain output of the plateaux in a very few years. A sum has been set aside to pay the dues of indigent peasants—the peasants must pay a small fee per acre ploughed by the tractors—and an interesting sidelight is thrown on the individualism with which the Government hopes to offset the effects of collectivization, by the provision that no peasant shall have more than a quarter of his land ploughed by the *combinat*, so that he shall not “lose the joy of ploughing his own land”.

In a last category there are general improvements to the capital equipment of the community which benefit the farmers either directly—such as irrigation—or indirectly—for example, the development of communications which link villages with markets for their produce and open up the interior to the more civilized life of the coastal plains. Much can and will be done for Turkey by irrigation. The turbulent rivers, with their short spring flooding and their summer drought, can be brought under control and their waters used to develop wide stretches of barren country. In Cilicia a big project is already under construction on the River Seyhan. To this were added in 1940 budget appropriations to

the sum of over £T180 millions, to cover schemes for irrigation, draining and river control in all the major valleys—the Dicle Nehiri 'Tigris', the Firat Nehiri 'Euphrates', the Kizil Irmak, the Sakarya, and half a dozen others.

The roads of Turkey seem to have shared in the relative neglect of the country areas. There is a good motor-ing road from the Bulgarian frontier to Istanbul, and another from Trabzon to the frontier of Iran (to canal-ize a part of Iran's foreign trade). The roads along the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to Izmir are fair. Inland the tracks are dreadful. Within ten miles of Ankara the roads after rain can become indistinguishable from the unfenced, ploughed fields through which they run, and enterprising chauffeurs will often take to the open country. Dust is the enemy in high summer, although journeys by road are possible. Mud makes caterpillar wheels necessary in spring and autumn. In winter there is snow to be reckoned with. It was undoubtedly the difficulty of transit which added to the horrors and the death-roll of the earthquake in the New Year, 1940. The earthquake occurred in a countryside blanketed with snow, and for some days the rescuers could make no progress towards the devastated regions. By the time they reached them, some 30,000 lives had been lost. However, the future of Turkey's roads is more hopeful. In 1939 the Government adopted a ten-year plan to cover the spending of £T120 millions on the country's road system.

Railways have fared better, partly because the Re-public inherited a certain equipment from the Empire, including the Turkish stretch through Istanbul, Konya, and Adana of the unfinished Berlin-to-Baghdad rail-way. These lines were, however, under foreign control and—this is the history of Turkish industrialization gen-erally—the foreign concessionaries had to be bought out

before the Republic could begin much capital outlay of its own. The three largest companies were bought out for £T55 millions in 1928. To-day only the railway on the Syrian border is foreign owned, and Turkey is developing its own system vigorously. Roughly speaking, the Empire provided Turkey with an adequate system in the west and south and completely neglected the north and east. Turkey's railway building has been planned to fill in these gaps, and at the same time to open up the eastern provinces to the outside world. The biggest projects so far completed are the line from Ankara through the iron and steel centre, Karabük, to the Black Sea ports and coalfields at Zonguldak and Ereğli; the line from Ankara to Kayseri, the cotton centre, and on to Sivas and Samsun, another Black Sea port; to the east, a line from Sivas to Erzerum, which now continues through Kars to the Russian frontier town of Leninsk; and a line to Ergani and Diyarbakir in the centre of the Kurd country, which is also one of the big mining districts of Turkey. The projects voted in 1940 follow the same plan of development. To the north a railway is to run parallel with the Black Sea coast, linking Istanbul direct with the Ankara-Zonguldak and Ankara-Samsun railways. To the east, the railway is being extended to the Iraqi frontier, taking in on its way the town of Siirt, where the Turks have at last—literally—struck oil.

If country life and country roads are to some extent the Cinderella of Turkey's economy, it must be remembered that this is relative. Even here progress has been rapid. Cotton output is more than trebled since 1929, tobacco and sugar more than doubled. The whole area under cultivation is up anything from 50 to 60 per cent., and the application of large-scale methods to grain-farming is only beginning. What the Turkish economy needs most is a large, stable internal market for the

manufactures it is beginning to produce. This can be provided only by a prosperous peasantry, and the Turks should learn from the disastrous American slump of 1929 the price a far more stable and prosperous community paid for neglecting its farming class.

CHAPTER XI

BUILDING AN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM

ETATISM, or State Socialism, was officially adopted as a plank in the Government's programme in 1935, over eleven years after the founding of the Republic, and two years after the launching of Turkey's first Five-Year Plan. The date is significant. Etatism is something which after ten years the Republic found to be the most suitable form of organizing its economy. It has never been a gospel of social regeneration. It was not a first principle from which the rest of the workings of Turkish economy were deduced. Like the trend towards collectivization in agriculture, it is a policy dictated on the one hand by the realities of the Turkish situation, on the other by the overruling aim of creating a modern powerful and independent Turkey in the shortest space of time.

In 1922 Turkish industrialism had begun. There were about 17,000 industrial workers. Railways had been constructed, mining for coal was in full swing in the Zonguldak area, textiles and carpets were produced, and the big towns had gas- and water-works and tram services. The singular fact about this activity was that it was almost entirely in foreign hands. Capitulations had been abolished in 1914. The legacy of capitulations, the mortgaging of the country to foreign interests, remained.

In these circumstances étatism, or the developing and running of public utilities and most of the key industries by the State out of public funds, was virtually the only course open to Atatürk, if he were ever to hope to create an independent, nationalist republic. The only capitalists were foreign capitalists. The only merchants were

foreigners, or local Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. There was no private Turkish capital. There could thus be no private Turkish capitalist economy. Either the State built industry, or left it to the foreigners—a solution excluded by the political revolution—or there was no industry.

The first ten years of the Republic were spent in an effort to clear up the financial position of the régime. From the Ottoman Empire the new State inherited on the one hand 40 per cent. of its old and onerous debt (in 1933 it still stood at £93 millions in gold), on the other, a profound distrust of foreign capitalists and a determination to develop the country on an economically independent basis. It is possible that the Government hoped in those early days to rely mainly on private enterprise. Every encouragement, in the form of free land for factories and preferential taxation and customs duties, was given, and State enterprise was confined to one or two factories managed by the Industry and Mining Bank. This institution, which exercised the functions of capitalist and manager on behalf of the Government, was to be the model of later experiments in State control, although it was itself superseded by the Sumer Bank in 1933.

During this period private enterprise was responsible for a certain amount of industrial expansion. By 1933, 62,000 people were employed in industry and the expansion of textiles was going ahead in private hands. The centre of private enterprise in textiles was—and has remained—Adana. Here, with the help of three small State factories, yarns and textiles to the extent of well over 5 million yards a year are produced.

In spite of a definite degree of progress, the pace was not hot enough for Atatürk and his advisers. We citizens of old-established industrial countries do not always realize the immense psychological significance to new countries of industrialization on an independent national

basis. Their past experience of industry has usually been confined to exploitation by foreigners and their hopes of future independence seem to turn on the building up of an independent industrial system, particularly of heavy industry and the sinews of war. By 1933 the Turkish Government had decided that it was time for more active intervention. The savings of the community, heavily though taxation already weighed upon it, were insufficient for ambitious schemes of industrialization. Where else could the Government turn?

In 1933 the old Ottoman Debt had been scaled down, as a result of the world crisis, from £92 to £7 millions, and the strategic importance of the country, derived from its commanding position in the Eastern Mediterranean, was beginning to create for it a semi-privileged position in its dealings with its old creditors, France and Britain. Foreign credits, which had been anathema in the early and uncertain days of the Republic, could be re-considered. As early as 1930 a private loan of \$10 millions had been arranged with Ivan Kreuger. The Five-Year Plan of 1933 necessitated more. Turkey turned to Russia, and negotiated another \$10 millions loan. In the years that followed, the Turks shepherded their resources by carrying on four-fifths of their trade on a clearing basis. The difficulty was that whereas Central Europe was accounting for a larger and larger share in Turkey's trade, her financial obligations were to France and Britain, who took only a small proportion of her exports—not nearly enough to cover even the reduced payments on the Ottoman Debt. However, Britain's readiness to grant credits and Turkey's readiness to accept them were increasing. In 1938 a £6 millions loan for armaments to be purchased from Britain was negotiated, together with a £10 millions trade credit, all of which went to increasing Turkey's capital equipment. By this time the international situation was leading to competitive lending. Germany lent Rm. 150 millions,

Russia \$8 millions in gold. All these credits were used to speed up industrialization by the purchase of machinery. In 1939 came more credits: the Treaty of Mutual Assistance signed by Turkey, France, and Britain in October 1939 was accompanied by a credit of £25 millions from Turkey's two allies, together with a loan of £15 millions in gold and supplementary items to the sum of £3½ millions.

These loans have not, of course, by any means covered the whole cost of industrialization. The country—like every other country—has met the change by taxation and compulsory saving in the shape of a low standard of living. For example, the estimated cost of the first Five-Year Plan in 1933 stood at £T40 millions. The credit from Russia covered only a part of this. The rest was supplied by the Sumer Bank, which was set up by the Government to run the first Five-Year Plan and drew on the taxable capacity of the community for its original capital of £T20 millions—a sum which in the course of the Plan was raised to £T80 millions.

The first Five-Year Plan was designed for the most part to stimulate the production of consumption goods which could easily be made in Turkey and could thus replace imports from abroad. Textiles, which in every oriental country—Persia, Japan, India, China—have been the first branch of industrialization, were the obvious choice. Under the Government's scheme, between 1931 and 1938 the number of spindles rose from 72,000 to 189,000, and the great factory at Kayseri was established, which, with its 33,000 spindles, is the largest cotton-mill in the whole Near East.

The other aim of the Plan was to lay the basis of local heavy industry—the pre-requisite of genuine independence. To-day the main centres of industrial development are the coalfields round Zonguldak, where the French concessionaries have gradually been bought out, and where subsidiary industries, such as sulphur and

anthracite, have been established; the iron and steel factory at Karabük, the pride of Turkey, the first gesture of genuine economic power, the first real guarantee of economic independence, which, built by a British firm, Brasserts, began production in September 1939, but which, by the unhappy chance of their later discovery, is separated by over 400 miles of inadequate railways and worse roads from the rich iron-ore reserves at Divrik; Kayseri, centre of the textile industry; Sivas and Divrik for iron ore; Istanbul, Izmir, and the Bosphorus for consumption goods such as paper, cellulose, glass, and ceramics; chrome ore round Eskeshehir and, farther south, Antalya; and in the east, round Er-gani, lies potentially the richest mineral district of all, with chrome, copper, and at Siirt, the first recorded discovery of oil. The *Eti* Bank, set up in 1936, runs the mineral exploitation of the country for the Government and conducts the Institute of Mining Study and Research, to whose credit already stands the discovery of the iron-ore reserves at Divrik and a new source of chrome ore at Guleman. Chrome is particularly important, since Turkey is one of the world's greatest producers. The *Eti* Bank's work has been drawn up under the Three-Year Plan, which, announced in 1937, was designed to increase the mineral output of the Republic.

The war has interrupted a number of promising projects of industrialization. Capital, always a serious problem to the Government, has had to be diverted to defence. Nevertheless, the industrialization of Turkey has been developing along two new lines since the beginning of the war. The discovery of oil at Siirt in April 1940 has been followed by extensive and reputedly successful borings. It had long been very galling to the Republic to be surrounded by oil lands—Rumania to the west, Baku to the north-east, Iran and Iraq to the south-east—while the land within its own frontiers remained obstinately barren. It was doubly galling in that the

oilfields of the Caucasus are inhabited mainly by Turkish speaking peoples and the possession of Mosul, Iraq's richest oilfield, was for a number of years in dispute between Turkey and Britain, Iraq's Mandatory Power. The settlement of the dispute in 1927 left Turkey with the right to 10 per cent. of the oil output and a sense of considerable grievance. Should Siirt develop into an important oilfield, a potential cause of friction would be removed.

The other line of development is power. Here, too, the *Eti* Bank is the controlling institution, and at present the schemes cover an important contract secured by Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company, Ltd., for a large power-station at Chatalazi in the Zonguldak industrial area and a number of other power-stations—at Kutahya, the supply generated from lignite and serving the Istanbul-Izmit area; at Chaghlayik, where the waters of the Sakarya will be used to serve Ankara; and at Adala, to supply the Aegean coast.

These are great things that have been done in the last ten years. Naturally enough, they are incomplete. Turkey's industrialization is extremely sketchy and unfinished, and just as there is still no fully articulated industrial society, so there is little trace so far of the development of industrial working classes. Not 10 per cent. of the population work in the factories, and every industrial centre gives evidence of the extent to which industry is still a pursuit which the peasant will follow a year or two to increase his earnings, or work at for a part of the year when agricultural work is slack. It follows that the problems of an industrial society have not yet arisen in Turkey. There is no entrepreneur class bent on augmenting profits, no working-class movement organized to obtain better conditions and higher wages. It is possible that under *étatisme* there will never be either. The bureaucrat, the State inspector, the engineer are apparently to be the directors of the growth of the Turkish

economy—types which present their own problems, but not the same problems as those of private capitalism. The workers are not organized into unions for collective bargaining, on the one hand because both unions and strikes are forbidden, but, on the other, because the standards of living made possible by work in the factories and the facilities offered in the way of housing, cleanliness, and recreation already far surpass anything a peasant coming in for the first time from the fields would have the wit to demand.

One of the obvious pointers to the rather primitive stage of Turkey's industrialization is her defence position. The natural defences of Anatolia are good but Thrace is indefensible; for all the money that has been lavished on the defences over against Bulgaria, they would make a rearguard action possible, little more. It follows that Turkey would lose a fair proportion of her population and her largest city in the first days of a war against Germany. On the other hand, the Straits, Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, even if they are not so adequate a tank-trap as the English channel, are a formidable barrier. To the north Turkey's frontier defences are the sea, to the south the Mediterranean and the friendly country of Syria—though if Syria were hostile, it would be hard to hold Cilicia. To the east, wild mountain country divides Turkey from Russia, and there is only one railway connecting the two countries.

The armed forces are not negligible and are ferocious fighters in the tradition of their forefathers, the Sword-arm of Islam. There is a regular army of about 20,000 officers and 174,000 men, which at war strength amounts roughly to twenty-three divisions, an armoured brigade, eight cavalry divisions, and seven fortress commands. About 2 million men could be mobilized, but much of the military material is out of date. The navy has a battle cruiser and two cruisers, all dating from before the last war, some gunboats, destroyers, and M.T.B.'s,

as well as a number of auxiliary naval vessels—not a strong force nor an up-to-date one. The Air Force, too, is small, consisting of 370 first-line aircraft and a personnel of about 8,500. Turkish pilots have the reputation of being recklessly good, the aerodromes of being dangerous and primitive.

The weak spot is, of course, equipment. Turkey has two or three small-arms factories, an aeroplane assembly plant near Kayseri, the *promise* of iron and steel at Karabük, the *promise* of oil at Siirt. It follows that Turkey is quite inadequately equipped for modern war. She must rely completely upon a powerful, industrialized ally. If she cannot rely on such an ally, she cannot hope to fight with very much more success than Holland or Yugoslavia. This radical insufficiency of arms and war material must be remembered whenever Turkey's foreign policy comes up for discussion.

CHAPTER XII

TURKEY IN THE MODERN WORLD

i. FOREIGN TRADE

IT is difficult to discuss Turkey's relations with the outside world without a word about the state of her foreign trade. Germany's use of commercial dealings as an instrument of diplomacy has made foreign trade almost a subordinate part of foreign relations generally. Turkey lies to the south-east of Germany, on the route to Baghdad. The usual Nazi methods of economic penetration have been applied with the same energy in Turkey as in any of the Balkan countries. Turkey, for her part, has used her commercial and financial negotiations with Britain and France to offset Germany's growing pressure, and it is no coincidence that the curve of Turkey's foreign trade has on the whole followed the variations in her foreign relations. In fact, the diplomatic struggle can best be taken against the economic background of markets and loans.

Turkey is, of course, primarily an agricultural country. She has practically no manufacture for export. Even her traditional export of carpets has declined with the decline of handicrafts under the pressure of industrialization. The community is one of primary producers; men who, as farmers or miners, produce the primary raw materials of the industrial process, minerals—such as chrome and coal; cotton and tobacco; or the basic foodstuffs—wheat and olives and fruit. At a time of relative stability in world trade, Turkey, along with other primary producers, was able to balance her trade, using the good prices which she secured to import manufac-

tured industrial equipment of all sorts as well as consumption goods. In 1929 Turkey's foreign trade was quite prosperous and she traded with a wide range of States. There were certain difficulties, in that her exports to Britain and France were at no time sufficient to cover her service on the old Ottoman Debt. After 1928 France was coming to depend more and more on her own Empire for the range of primary products Turkey could export, and Britain already bought cotton from Egypt and the United States, smoked Virginia tobacco, and relied to a large extent on the Empire for food-stuffs.

The slump of 1929 hit Turkey as severely as any other country. Foreign trade shrank catastrophically, and to prevent a complete unbalancing of their economy, the Turks resorted to clearing agreements; by 1933 only the United States was trading with them on a basis of free exchange. The earlier difficulties still persisted in Turkey's relations with the West. There were always uncleared balances, for neither France nor Britain could find enough to buy in Turkey to cover their exports there.

It was at this point that Germany entered the arena. During the course of 1935 Dr. Schacht worked out the simple magic whereby he enabled the debtor State to call the tune in foreign trade. The process of buying and buying and buying with blocked marks which was so uniformly successful in the Balkans was applied to Turkey. The Germans bought tobacco. They bought fruit. They bought nuts. They bought cotton. They were particularly anxious to buy chrome. In return there were machines and chemicals and medicaments and a certain percentage, of course, of "aspirin and aspidistras". But since the mounting German debt to Turkey could not be converted into any other currency, Germany's share of Turkey's total foreign trade increased to something over 50 per cent. between 1933 and 1937.

However, unlike their more gullible Balkan brethren, the Turks began to take alarm. In 1938 and 1939 they turned more and more to Britain and France, whose share in Turkey's trade rose while Germany's fell—but only slightly. The difficulties inherent in Anglo-French trade with Turkey remained obstinately the same. France was even more deeply committed to a monopolist colonial trade policy; Ottawa had occurred in 1932. The attempt was made to overcome this by the credit of £16 millions granted by Britain to Turkey in 1938, but Germany capped this with her Rm. 150 millions credit. It was not easy for the Turks to trade with their Mediterranean neighbours either. The economies of Italy, Greece, the Levant, or Egypt were competitive, not complementary—they produced the same range of fruit and nuts and cotton and tobacco. Russia's foreign trade with Turkey, like Russia's foreign trade generally, was on a small scale. Thus Germany had the advantage of being the only great industrialized Power ready to trade extensively with the Turks.

Nevertheless, in 1939, as the probability of war increased and Germany's aggressions multiplied, the Turks attempted to draw still farther away from Germany. Throughout the summer of 1939 economic parleys accompanied the negotiations between Britain, France and Turkey for the Pact of Ankara. On the outbreak of war the Turks did not renew their trade agreements with Germany, and for a few months trade came to a complete standstill. At the same time the new Allied credit of £25 millions, agreed to in October, after the signing of the Treaty of Ankara, was designed to foster trade by arranging that interest and amortization should be paid in tobacco and other Turkish exports. This agreement marked the high point of Turkey's relations with the Western Democracies. Not only was there no trade with Germany and a growing exchange of goods between the West and Turkey, but British firms were taking a lead-

ing part in the next stage of Turkey's industrial expansion. British firms were building the new power-stations, were responsible for the Karabük steel-works, opened a month before. British ship-builders were at work on the orders for the Turkish mercantile marine, others were putting in estimates for new ports and harbour installations. A British firm, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, had for two years been economic adviser to the Turkish Government. Yet, in spite of this promising background and the genuine goodwill on both sides to increase trade, the old difficulties remained. It was as hard as ever for France and Britain to discover suitable exports from Turkey, even though a Turkish Trade Mission visited London in November 1939 and in the same month France set up a special organization to arrange for the purchase of Turkish goods, a precedent which Britain followed on a wider scale with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, Limited. The problem was aggravated by the fact that two or three years' trading to such a great extent with Germany had thrust Turkish prices as much as 30 per cent. above world prices. The result was a constant uncleared balance unfavourable to Turkey in her trade agreements with the West. Early in 1940 the balance owing to Britain was £2 millions.

Meanwhile Germany was quietly launching a counter-offensive. At first it was merely an underground attempt to bribe the Press by withdrawing advertisements and to mobilize those Turkish firms with which Germany had had extensive dealings for a campaign of pressure on the Government to renew trade relations. The very unfortunate economic conditions inside Turkey undoubtedly played into Germany's hands. On top of the cessation of trade with their biggest customer and their inability to find real compensation elsewhere, the Turks suffered badly from the floods and earthquakes of early 1940. Besides a death-roll of 30,000, 100,000 people

were made homeless and 1,500,000 farm animals were killed. And while customs receipts declined steeply, taxation was increased from anything between 25 and 100 per cent., indirect taxation was raised by about 10 per cent., and the cost of living was believed to have risen by 50 per cent.

Here was an admirable background for German pressure. At first the Turks were willing to trade only on the basis of particular transactions for particular commodities. However, the Germans' anxiety for a new agreement led to the opening of negotiations, with no great enthusiasm on the part of the Turks, and these talks might have dragged on for some time had it not been for the collapse of the Western front.

The political consequences were, of course, catastrophic. But there were also direct economic consequences, disastrous in their own right. With the entry of Italy into the War—and already shortly before—the Mediterranean was virtually closed to shipping. Greek cargo-ships continued to ply between the Levant and Britain, but even this meagre service came to an end with the Greek war. Turkey was thus made completely dependent on two trade routes—the one the railway route to Basra, the other the Danube and the Black Sea. Unfortunately, the Basra route could not be expected to take a very heavy volume of trade. Thus after June 1940 Turkey became increasingly dependent upon German Europe, and in July of that year a commercial agreement with Germany was signed to the tune of £121 millions. The Germans went out of their way to give the Turks favourable terms. Among the clauses was the provision that Germany would undertake not only to transport Turkey's goods to Germany, but to deliver Turkey's purchases in Turkey. The Turks' transport problem was thus solved for them.

Since the autumn of 1940 Germany has steadily and

inevitably crept back to first place in Turkey's foreign trade. Even where the German purchases were not direct, Germany's new colonies—the Protectorate, Rumania, Hungary—bought from Turkey on a new and lavish scale. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation continued to make purchases—tobacco, chrome, and fruit—but transport difficulties were vast, and the British had to compete with strong German economic pressure and ubiquitous German trade missions. The Turks were loyal. For example, they would not sell either their mohair or their chrome until Britain's purchases were covered. Yet by 1941 Germany was well ahead.¹ The fall of Greece and the German occupation of the Greek islands, added to the occupation of the Black Sea ports from Sulina to the Turkish frontier, gave the Nazis complete control of the trade going through the Straits. Turkey's foreign trade could thus be strangled by a single German embargo; and it is against this background that in July 1941 Germany opened new trade talks with the Turks.

ii. FOREIGN POLICY

The development of Turkey's relations with the outside world runs parallel with the course of her economic life and foreign trade. First comes the period of consolidation and the establishment of unquestioned national independence. It is followed by an attempt at self-defence against the expansive threat of the Axis Powers, an attempt which takes the form of closer association with her smaller neighbours to east and west and with the Western Powers, Britain and France. Finally—a stage that is not yet complete—the fortunes of war

| ¹ Turkey's exports to: | January 1940. | January 1941. |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Germany . . . | 180,000 liras | 3,660,000 liras |
| Britain . . . | 2,173,000 „ | 2,844,000 „ |

Powers in their favour, for, instead of marching into the demilitarized zone, the Turks preferred to see the new status of the Straits worked out at an international conference at Montreux, where, together with the right to remilitarize her own territory, Turkey secured a revision of the clauses governing the passage of ships through the Straits—this narrow strip of water which, though it looks at each outlet like the Thames at London, is in fact an arm of the sea. Tradition demands that the ships of the Powers should use it as freely as the high seas, but the unusual nature of this particular strip of the high seas makes some modification necessary in the interests of Turkey. The Montreux Convention permitted unrestricted use of the Straits to the warships and merchantmen of the Black Sea Powers and to the merchant ships of any Power in time of peace. During war Black Sea warships still enjoyed unrestricted passage, provided they were helping a victim of aggression under the Covenant of the League. In a war in which Turkey was herself a belligerent, full control of the Straits passed to her.

The settlement of the Alexandretta dispute dragged on to the brink of the next war. France was in the awkward position of not possessing the Sanjak, but of being the trustee of it for the Syrians. The Turks, on the other hand, had claimed it from the start, on the grounds of its large Turkish population. The French gave it first a special status, later autonomy, and finally in 1939, when the securing of an alliance with Turkey was the Allies' paramount interest in the Levant, the transfer of the Sanjak to Turkey was completed. Another grievance was thus added to the Syrian Nationalists' long list, but France's treaty with Turkey was secured. The Sanjak, known in the future as the Hatay, became an integral part of the Turkish Republic, and sent five deputies to the National Assembly in the elections of 1939.

The Dodecanese alone is an unsettled problem. These islands, which lie immediately off the Aegean shores of Turkey, are inhabited mainly by Greeks. Were the Italians not in occupation, they would almost certainly be a cause of friction between the Greeks and the Turks, since Turkey claims them on historic and strategic, Greece on ethnic, grounds. As it is, their common dislike of Italy's presence there has been a cause of sympathy and goodwill between the two potential claimants, and it is possible that, by now, they have come to an agreement on the division of the islands between them, against the happy day of the Axis' defeat.

Turkey emerged from the war with a strong distrust of the European Powers. It took the form of holding aloof from them and regarding all their actions with reserve and suspicion. Thus, by a paradox, the Turks were most separated from the West at a time when—between 1925 and 1929—they were being forced with the greatest possible speed into the customs of Western civilization. But it no longer looks like a paradox if it is remembered that the policy of Westernization was a policy of self-defence—to keep out the West by adopting its technique. Relations were particularly uncordial with France and Britain, with whom the scores of Mosul and Alexandretta were still outstanding. They were not at first much better with the Balkan States, for Turkey had unsolved minority problems not only with Greece, but with Bulgaria and Rumania too. Italy was anxious to exploit Turkey's distrust of France, and there was a slight improvement of relations in 1928, and a Pact of Friendship in 1930; but the Turks did not forget either the Dodecanese or the Italians' readiness in the last war to occupy large areas in Anatolia. Besides, the Duce could not resist referring constantly to Italy's "historic rôle" in the Levant, a phrase which had a sinister ring in Turkish ears.

Some compensation for this isolation was to be found in Russia. Like Turkey, a revolutionary State, outcast from the West, the Soviets had shown sympathy for Turkish independence from the first days of Mustafa Kemal. When in 1925 the dispute over Mosul was brewing, Turkey signed with Russia a ten-year Pact of Neutrality and Friendship, which was renewed in 1935. Official relations were cordial, and no causes of external friction intervened. Nevertheless, there was no sort of fundamental *rapprochement* between the two States. Atatürk was interested in his own national revolution, not in world revolution. The Communist Party was specifically banned in Turkey, and while Soviet engineers came to help in the building up of the textile industry, there was no popular contact between the two lands. And, although Russia did nothing at the time to revive old fears, there remained in almost every politically conscious Turk the memory of Russia's ambitions under the Czarist régime—Constantinople, the control of the Straits—and an uneasy fear that geography and economics rather than revolutions determine the permanent lines of a country's foreign policy.

By 1930 Turkey had every right to feel that her national position was consolidated. The time had come to put an end to her self-imposed isolation from the West and to play a part in international society. Atatürk's reforms had excited sympathy and interest, while the country's position of complete independence gave it an opening for positive leadership in the Near East. Thus, in 1932 Turkey reaffirmed both her national sovereignty and her desire for international co-operation by joining the League of Nations. A year later Hitler came to power.

Turkey's history since 1933—like the history of most of the States of Europe—has been one of a search for security against the encroachments of the "living spaces"

of predatory Great Powers. Although it is difficult to envisage it now, Italy headed the list of potential aggressors for quite a time before the menace of Hitler's drive to the East became apparent. Mussolini's claim to an imperial mission in the Levant and his war on Abyssinia sent a tremor of apprehension through the Middle East. Turkey was prime mover in an attempt to bring the threatened States together, so that at the least their differences would not be exploited by a potential aggressor, and that at the most they could arrange some system of mutual defence. The Saadabad Pact, signed in 1937, did not go so far, but Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey recognized the inviolability of each other's frontiers in return for guarantees of non-aggression.

As much at first against Italy as against Germany, the Balkan States also drew together. Turkey worked for this by establishing good relations with her Balkan neighbours, particularly with Greece, with whom in 1933, eleven years after driving the shattered Greek army into the sea at Smyrna, she signed a Treaty of Friendship which included a mutual guarantee of frontiers. This position of being on good terms with a group of States which were themselves divided by a number of mutual antipathies gave Turkey the lead in Balkan co-operation. In 1929 the practice of holding conferences of the Balkan States had begun, but in that year a project of Balkan federation came to nothing because of Bulgaria's determination not to accept existing frontiers as the geographical basis of the federation—the difficulty over which all subsequent attempts at Balkan consolidation were to come to grief. The Turks did not despair at the setback. By this time the peoples of Eastern Europe were beginning to turn a wary eye on the Nazis' activities in Austria, which, though more hooligan and less insidious than their later experiments in disintegration, brought the new German menace to the

frontiers of the Balkans. In 1934, shepherded by the Turks, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece signed with Turkey the Balkan Pact, which brought into being a Balkan Entente based on a Council of the four Foreign Ministers and on an Economic Council. Thus Turkey became the pivot of an embryonic security system spreading from the Danube to the frontiers of India. However, Bulgaria's continued refusal to co-operate was a symbol of the necessity of this "security" system.

With the crises of Sanctions, the Rhineland *coup*, and the Spanish War upon them, the nations of Europe began to split up into rival fronts based on the Axis Pact on the one hand and the Franco-Russian Alliance on the other. Turkey, as a "status-quo" Power, was naturally inclined towards the second grouping, and might have joined it sooner—possibly after the Montreux Conference—had not Britain been anxious to avoid this dividing of Europe into two camps; Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to secure an Italian agreement led his Government to reject—though with great cordiality—a suggestion put forward as early as 1937 that Turkey and Britain might come to a closer understanding. As the Turks had recently—it was during Sanctions—offered the British Navy the hospitality of their waters in the event of naval warfare in the Mediterranean and were now co-operating in the Nyon patrol, the British Government felt that a Pact would prejudice Mr. Chamberlain's long-drawn-out and long-suffering negotiations with the Duce. It is to the credit of the Turks that they were not rebuffed. On the contrary, from 1937 onwards Turkey became one of Germany's most constant and hard-hitting critics. The daily Press was full of warnings over Germany's intentions in the Balkans, and the Government vigorously carried on its attempts to find the *modus vivendi* which would bring Bulgaria into a system of collective Balkan security. In 1938 the Balkan States went

so far as to recognize Bulgaria's right to rearm, but her frontier claims proved an insuperable difficulty. Moreover, the Regency in Yugoslavia was already on its spineless downward path towards co-operation with the Nazis. By 1939 it did not look as though an effective Balkan defence system could be formed.

On the other hand, Britain was at last jolted into action by the catastrophe of Munich and the occupation of Prague, six months later. Negotiations were opened with Russia. Concurrently with them, France and Britain began their parleys with the Turkish Government. These summer months of 1939 must have seemed very promising to the Turks. The collective security which had collapsed at Geneva, and had never been anything but still-born in the Balkan capitals, looked like being built up again by an alliance between the Great Powers of East and West. The Turks could not know that Russia was also negotiating with Germany and that France's heart was really in the policy of Munich, not of united resistance. The Turks saw only that the Axis Powers, unresisted, would seize the Mediterranean and Asia Minor as they had seized everything else on which they could lay their hands. At the same time, Turkey could look forward to resisting the Axis advance in company with a solid combination of Great Powers.

The distress and consternation with which the Turks learnt of the Russo-German Pact in August 1939 can be imagined. The whole picture of defence, as they had imagined it, collapsed. Since, however, Italy did not at first enter the war, and the Mediterranean and the Balkans remained at peace, the Turks were not immediately drawn into the conflict, and had time to try to adjust themselves to the new situation. The Foreign Minister, M. Sarajoglu, hurried to Moscow to discover the meaning of this *volte face* in Russian policy and to find some way of combining Turkey's alliance with the West—a

general declaration of Mutual Assistance agreed to by Britain and Turkey in May and by France and Turkey in the following month—with their Pact of Friendship with Russia, now Germany's friend. At first the Russians were guarded but not unfriendly, and there was even talk of a Black Sea Pact of Mutual Assistance. The arrival of Ribbentrop put an end to all this. M. Sarajoglu was left to kick his heels and inspect the Moscow Underground, while the Turkish Press grew more and more hostile both to the Russians' diplomacy and to their discourtesy to M. Sarajoglu. Finally, after some fruitless talks, the Foreign Minister returned and declared that Turkey was anxious to sign the full Pact with Britain and France at once. What happened at Moscow? It can only be surmised, but it seems clear that, under pressure from the Nazis, Russia attempted to threaten Turkey into abandoning her alliance with the West. And the Turkish Foreign Minister, with courage and dignity, accepted the risks, declined to betray France and Britain, and withdrew. A few weeks later, on October 19th, the Pact of Ankara between Britain, France, and Turkey was signed.

Briefly, this Treaty covered a guarantee of assistance to Turkey if attacked by a European Power, of mutual assistance in the event of war in the Mediterranean, and of assistance from Turkey if Britain and France became involved in war as a result of their guarantees to Rumania and Greece. An important protocol recognized that Turkey could not be called upon to do anything which would involve her in war with Russia.

The attitude of the Turks during the first months of the war was characterized by complete and friendly loyalty to their Allies and by a strong revulsion of feeling against Russia. The Pact with Germany was a shock, M. Sarajoglu's treatment in Moscow an insult, but worst of all was Russia's cynical annexation of large

tracts of territory which seemed vital to her security. Whether this new spirit of expansionism was protective or flatly imperialist did not concern the Turks. They only saw that the Straits and Constantinople could be seized on grounds of security as well as on any other. The old fear of Russia, bred of two centuries of the "Eastern Question", reared up in them again. The protocol attached to the Treaty of Ankara was not the outcome of friendship but of fear. At all costs the Turks felt they had to avoid a war on two fronts.

Apart from this fear of Russia, which increased with each new Russian annexation, the first winter of the war passed smoothly enough for the Turks. There was some excitement and the severest public condemnation of German propaganda methods when the Germans launched the tale, with the inevitable documents, that Turkey had been ready to allow the Allies to use Asia Minor as a base for operations against Batum during the Finnish campaign. Otherwise the Turks watched the war with superb confidence. Their Press was uncompromisingly anti-German. The massing of the French army of the Levant in Syria and of Empire troops in Egypt created the impression of invincible Allied strength. The Turks hoped, naturally, that Italy would remain neutral—the Press was full of warnings on that score—and that neither Balkans nor Mediterranean would come into the fighting line. But they were perfectly ready to fight if Italy chose to disregard the warnings.

It was into this mood of confidence and security that Germany's Western campaigns broke like a bomb dropped from the stratosphere. It is essential to realize how utterly unexpected, how entirely shattering, was the impact of France's defeat and Britain's isolation upon their Turkish ally. One week, the army of the Levant stood half a million strong at Turkey's back door, the British

Navy steamed about unmolested in the Mediterranean and far away, across a continent, other Allied armies guarded an impregnable Maginot line; the next, the army of France had evaporated, the army of the Levant was ready to disband, the British Navy might not hold Malta or even Alexandria. France had gone. There was a wide belief that Britain would ask for peace within a week. Although Italy at this point entered the war and the clauses of the Ankara Pact covering mutual assistance in the Mediterranean became relevant the Turks could plead that the whole basis of these provisions—Anglo-French solidarity—had disappeared. Accordingly, Turkey did not enter the war.

Since that decision in June 1940, Turkish foreign policy has been on the whole passive. The Turks did not go to the assistance of the Greeks when their land was invaded by Italy in October 1940. Later, they did not fight with Britain, Greece, and Yugoslavia when, in April 1941, Germany entered the Greek war to deliver the *coup de grâce*. Thereafter, in July, they signed a Pact of Friendship with Germany, and retreating at last from the steadfastly anti-Axis tone of their Press, became colourless and neutral in comment. These facts cannot be blurred over. Nevertheless the chronicle must be put into the right perspective.

Can the Turks be severely blamed for the steady retreat of their diplomacy? Hardly, for the policy of any country is conditioned not only by the ends it wishes to pursue, but by the means at its disposal for doing so. The aim of Turkish foreign policy is above reproach—the strength and independence of Turkey in a peaceful and co-operative world order. The means of achieving it—trained soldiers, tanks, guns, aircraft—are strictly limited. The first claim on these resources, the Turks maintain, is the defence of their frontiers, particularly their frontier in Thrace. Once that front is secured, then the

rest, and, under certain conditions, possibly all the nation's military resources might be devoted to a common pool of collective defence. This order of allocation is perhaps irrational, since, under the terrific impact of the war machine of a modern industrial giant like Germany, small Powers cannot hope to resist successfully except in a collective system in company with other highly industrialized Powers. Without such a system there is only one choice: either to fight at the frontier—for honour, not for survival—or to give in. *But if sacrifices are to be made for a collective system, the system must exist, and Turkey can be blamed for her policy of retreat only if, like Bulgaria, she obstinately refused to build up a system of collective security while there was time, or if, like Belgium, she expected to be defended by the Great Powers without preliminary staff talks after a long period of neutrality, on the whole disadvantageous to them.*

The Turks cannot be accused of either policy. In urging collective security they went much further, and did far more than, for example, the Allied statesmen of Munich. They were the leaders of the movement for Balkan co-operation, they went on urging it until the surrender of Rumania in the autumn of 1940. They were ready in the spring of 1941 to consider it again when Mr. Anthony Eden and Sir John Dill visited Ankara, only here it was not only Bulgaria, but Yugoslavia that betrayed the plan. The substitution of the Government of King Peter for the pusillanimous Regency came too late to make the concerting of military measures possible, and in any case the Germans had by that time already moved a heavy force to the Turco-Bulgarian frontier.

Nor was Turkey responsible for the military performance of the Allies. Even before the collapse of France, the question of military supplies was causing some misgiving, for the Allies had guaranteed Turkey supplies of vital armaments which were not forthcoming. Then

France collapsed, and Turkish defence was weaker by half a million trained French soldiers. Although Britain's performance in Libya helped to restore some measure of confidence, this was dissipated in Greece and Crete. Nor were the campaigns in Iraq and Syria entirely reassuring. True, the Turks were relieved to see Britain put an end to the threat of their being completely encircled by German puppet States, but the lesson of Cyrenaica—that all occupations are provisional until the German army is destroyed—has made Turkish public opinion a little sceptical about the permanence of the settlement in the Levant, at least at this stage of the war. And, as very near spectators of the crises of May and June 1941, they could not but feel that the Germans had not exerted their full strength to assist either Rashid Ali or General Dentz. Thus, though it may be said that Turkey's policy has not been quixotically heroic, the Turks have a certain right to resent criticism from the Allies, whom they feel, with or without justification, have so far let them down.

Nor has the entry of Russia into the war so far restored their confidence. Superficially it looks as though the picture of the summer of 1939 has—but for the defection of France—been restored, and in France's place is the increasing intervention of the United States. But the Turks have not so easily forgotten their fears, the old deeply embedded fears of Russian imperialism, which were brought surging to the surface by Russia's annexations in 1939 and 1940. The Germans have naturally taken full advantage of this panic temper. On June 22nd Hitler made a point of including in his indictment of Russia a supposed inquiry on Stalin's part as to his (Hitler's) reactions to a Russian annexation of the Straits. The skilful propagandists gathered at Ankara round Germany's Ambassador, Von Papen, lose no opportunity of driving in the wedge. For example, the

phrase in Mr. Churchill's broadcast on the Russians' entry into the war in which he referred to their contribution to the victory of 1918, from whose benefits they were excluded, was twisted by the Nazis to mean that the Prime Minister regretted Russia's failure to achieve the particular "benefit" allotted to her under the Secret Treaties—the Straits and Constantinople.

Against such a background of rumour and counter-rumour a German offer of "protective occupation" might not seem so fantastic, and it was significant that by the end of July certain Turkish newspapers were arguing that as between Germany and a Britain mortgaged to Russia there was nothing to choose. To counter this, the unilateral guarantee of assistance given to the Turks by Britain and Russia in August 1941, had a steadying effect.

For the time being, however, the freedom of action Turkey can exercise in her foreign policy is severely limited. The German and Bulgarian armies press on her Thracian frontier. The garrisons of the Dodecanese have been reinforced. The Germans control the Black Sea coasts and ports of Rumania and Bulgaria. They also occupy the Greek islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles. There is thus virtually only one choice left to Turkey: whether, if the blow falls, she will fight or submit. To this decision the signing of a Pact of Friendship with Germany was rather irrelevant. Signing may have purchased a respite. Refusal to sign might have caused the thunderbolt to fall at once. It is possible that Turkey's neutrality still has some uses for the Germans. In that case she may yet become the Sweden of the Levant. But the decision no longer rests with the Turks. Their fortunes are being worked out on the battlefields of Smolensk and the Ukraine. The signs are ominous. Were the Germans to need to offset the Russian reverses another victory, if they determined on a flank move-

ment through Turkey to Batum, if they found Britain's direct link through Iraq and Iran with her Russian ally too inconvenient, then in some grey dawn the armies on the Thracian frontier might swing into motion, and the Turks would face the ordeal of Jugoslavia and Greece.

EPILOGUE

BEYOND the immediate fortunes of the war lies the problem of Turkey's future status. So far, apart from an informed *élite*, the Turkish people do not think much beyond the full national sovereign independence which is their heritage from Atatürk. But in the world to-day a system of uncoordinated relations between completely independent nation States no longer meets the needs of the great society. The nationalist revolutions of the nineteenth century—of which Atatürk's was perhaps the last and certainly one of the greatest—have done their work. The system they created is now impeding rather than forwarding the adaptation of social institutions to the changing world created by modern industrial methods and scientific technique.

So far, however, the alternative, the creative revolution of the twentieth century, has not been clearly established. The solutions of the *Lebensraum* or the "Sphere of Co-Prosperity" are discredited by their intention even before their practice is fully worked out, since they are only new names for the oldest form of exploitation, human slavery. But the antithesis of this, the confederation in which the unity necessary for planning and the autonomy necessary for free national growth co-exist, has not—apart from the great experiment of the British Empire—developed much beyond certain ideas about "getting mixed up together" current in the Anglo-Saxon world.

The position of Turkey is admittedly a problem. The storm raised by the suggestion of Russian "leadership" is only one slight indication of the Turks' passionate concern for their national sovereignty. On the other hand,

no State east of Italy has done so much for international co-operation, and the interlocking Balkan and Saadabad Ententes, even though they split up under the onslaught of Nazism, held out some hopes of a wider organization in the future. The Balkan Pact was more than a simple diplomatic instrument. It had at least the preliminary sketch of a system. The Council of Foreign Ministers had a joint responsibility for framing foreign policy, and the Economic Council did attempt some co-ordination of the separate economies of the four States.

Another hopeful sign is the extent to which the question of some form of federation has been discussed in the Turkish Press. Any views put forward by such men as M. Yalchin of *Yeni Sabah* or M. Falih Atay of *Ulus* carry great weight, since they are not only the editors of influential papers, but also members of the *Kamutay*. And in a country with so limited an *élite*, opinions canvassed in Press and Parliament tend to be representative of the informed and official thought of the community. Plans for a Balkan federation were under discussion throughout the first year and a half of the war—in fact until Hitler drove any autonomous Balkan scheme into a temporary cloud cuckoo land—and the dangers and evils of “living space” and “new order” were used as a text to underline the necessity of a federative framework. None of the schemes discussed went farther than a common foreign policy, common defence, and joint economic planning, but this is already far beyond anything achieved, or even envisaged so far.

It is certainly along these lines that the future stability and economic prosperity of Turkey and her neighbours must be sought. The working of any such scheme would, of course, benefit enormously by securing the political and economic backing of more highly developed Powers, and Turkey's independence is sufficiently established to permit such co-operation to go forward on a basis of equality. Probably the Turks will continue

to have insuperable objections to any Russian assumption of guidance or leadership in the political and economic sphere. But Britain has powerful Levantine interests, and will undoubtedly be called to play an active rôle in the reconstruction of the Middle East. The Turks have already worked in co-operation with the British, and know that a powerful Britain is no menace to their independence; on the contrary, their chief complaint is that Britain has not been powerful enough.

This, then, is perhaps the shape of things to come: an independent Turkey, linked in some federal framework with her Balkan neighbours, and enjoying the economic assistance and military partnership of the Western world.

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
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
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THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF TURKEY



TURKEY: AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL WEALTH

INDEX

- ABDUL HAMID, 27-5, 30, 37
 Abyssinia, 102
 Adala, 88
 Adana, 9, 11, 80, 84
 Adrianople, 38-9
 Aegean Sea (Coast), 7, 11, 15, 42, 53, 100
 Afforestation, 8, 9, 12
 Afghanistan, 102
 Afyonkarahisar, 47
 Agricultural Bank, the, 79
 — Institute, 78
 Agriculture, 11, 12, 15, 25, 58, 60, 73,
 76-9, 82-3, 88, 91
 Air Force, Turkish, 90
 Alexander the Great, 17
 Alexandretta, Sanjak of, 45, 48, 98-100
 Alexandria, 107
 Algeria, 21
 Allenby, Viscount, 22
 Allied Powers, the, 22, 30, 38, 40, 42,
 44-7
 — (1939-), 93, 99, 106-8
 Alphabet, reform of the, 69-70
 Anatolia (Asia Minor), 7-10, 12, 14, 17,
 22, 25, 30, 31, 39-40, 42-3, 89, 100,
 104, 106
 Anatolian Defence Rights Association,
 42-3, 47-8
 Angora cloth, 9
 Ankara (Angora), 8, 9, 11, 22, 35, 44-6,
 48, 54, 58, 60, 80, 81, 88, 98, 101,
 106, 108-10
 — National Congress at, 54
 — University of, 69
 — Agricultural Institute, 78
 Ankara Accord, 1921, the, 45
 Ankara, Pact and Treaty of, 1939, 93, 100,
 105-7
 Ankara régime, the, 45-8
 Antalya, 42, 44-5, 87
 Anthracite, 87
 Anzac, 38
 Arabia, 22
 Arabic script, 70
 Arabs, 17, 22, 30, 39
 Architecture, 69
 Armaments, 85, 90, 107-8
 Armenia, 11, 22
 Armenians, 20, 25, 39, 44, 84
 Army, Turkish, 25, 28, 30-32, 40, 46-7,
 53, 72, 78, 89, 107
 Asia Minor, *see* Anatolia
 Assyrians, the, 14
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 10, 12, 19, 26,
 33, 35-6, 38, 42, 44, 58, 76, 101, 112
 — reforms of, 31, 35n, 36, 40, 43, 48,
 51-2, 54-5, 57, 60, 61, 63-5, 70, 71,
 83-4
 — campaigns of, 38-9, 46-7
 — appointed C.-in-C., 46
 — as President, 50, 53
 — *See* Revolution, 1919.
 Austria, 102
 — Hungary, 21, 58
 Axis Pact, 103
 Axis Powers, the, 95, 98, 100, 102, 104
 Baghdad, 8, 91, 98
 Baku, 87
 Balikeshir, 45
 Balkan Pact, 1934, the, 103, 113
 Balkan States, the, 7, 19, 21-2, 27-8, 39,
 91-3, 95, 100, 102-4, 106, 113
 — conferences of, 102
 — proposed federation of, 102, 108,
 113-14
 — Foreign and Economic Council of,
 103, 113
 Balkan Wars, 30, 38-9
 Banking, 30, 79, 84
 Barley, 76
 Basra, 95
 Batum, 106, 111
 Belgium, 108
 Berlin-Baghdad Railway, 80
 Berlin, Congress of, 1878, 21
 Black Sea, the, 7, 8, 10, 22, 81, 95-6, 99,
 110
 Bosphorus, the, 10, 11, 80, 87-8
 British Empire, the, 92-3, 106, 113
 Bulgaria, 22, 27-8, 89, 100, 102-4, 108,
 110
 Bureaucracy, 59-60
 Byzantine Empire, the, 10, 17, 32
 Cabinet, Turkish, appointment of, 53
 Capitulations, 20, 21, 25, 31, 48, 83
 Carpets, 83, 91
 Catholics, 20
 Caucasus, the, 8, 83
 Chaghlayik, 88
 Chamberlain, Neville, 103
 Chanak, 47
 Chatalazi, 88
 China, 86
 Chrome and chrome-ore, 87, 91-2, 96
 Church, the, *see* Religion
 Churchill, Winston, 110
 Cilicia, Plain of, 11, 22, 44-5, 79, 89
 Climate, 8-11
 Coal and coalfields, 30, 83, 86, 91
 Collective security, 103-4, 108
 Collectivization, 77-9, 83
Combinais, 79
 Committee of Union and Progress, the,
 28, 30, 32, 37, 39, 52
 Communism, 47, 59, 101
 Conscript, 25, 42
 Constantinople, *see* Istanbul
 Constitution, 1876, the, 52
 — Republican, 53-4, 56, 62
 Consumption goods, 86-7, 92
 Co-operative credit societies, 79
 Copper, 87
 Cotton, 11, 74, 76, 81, 86, 91-3
 Council of Foreign Bondholders (1882), 26
 Credits, *see* Loans
 Crete, 109
 Crimea, 22
 Crimean War, the, 21, 37
 Cubuk Barrage, the, 9
 Cyprus, 22
 Cyrenaica, 109

- Damad Ferid, 39, 41, 44
 Damascus, 37, 39, 45
 Danube, River, 95, 103
 Dardanelles, the, 21, 38, 80, 89
 Defence, Turkish, 87, 89, 107, 109
 Defence of Rights Group, 47-8
 Defence Rights Association, *see* Anatolian
 Dentz, General, 109
 Dicle Nehiri (Tigris), River, 80
 Dill, Sir John, 108
 Divrik, 87
 Diyarbekir, 76, 81
 Dodecanese Is., 48, 97-8, 100, 110
Drang nach Osten, 7-8
 Druses, the, 39

 Earthquake, 1940, 80, 94
 "Eastern Question", the, 7, 106
 Eden, Anthony, 108
 Education, 31, 54, 58, 60, 64, 67-71,
 77-9
 See Schools
 Egypt, 22, 24-5, 37, 92-3, 106
 Elections, 48, 53, 60, 62, 65, 99
 Emancipation of women, 32, 53, 65, 67
 English Channel, the, 89
 Enver Behnan, *Filozof Gök Alp*, 27n.
 Enver Pasha, 28, 30, 31, 38
 Ephesus, ruins of, 12
 Eregli, 81
 Ergani, 81, 87
 Ertugrul, 17, 22
 Erzerum, 38, 81
 — conference at, 1919, 43
 Eskesbehir, 43, 87
 Etatism, 83, 88
 Eñ Bank, the, 87-8
 Euphrates, River, *see* Firat Nehiri
 Extra-territorial privileges, 20, 25

 Falih Atay, M., 113
 Feisal, King, 45
 Fethi Bey, 59, 63
 Fez, abolition of the, 64
 Finnish Campaign, the, 106
 Firat Nehiri (Euphrates) River, 80
 Five Year Plans, The, 73, 83, 85-6, 88
 Foreign policy, Turkish, 90, 91, 96, 98-112
 France, 20-22, 27, 30, 37, 42, 45-8, 59,
 85-6, 91-4, 96, 98-100, 104-5
 — collapse of, 95, 106-9
 Franco-Russian Alliance, the, 103
 Fruit and nuts, 10, 11, 74, 91-3, 96

 Gallipoli, 19, 47
 Georgia, 22
 German Commercial Code, 65n.
 Germany, 22, 45, 56, 105-6, 108-10
 — eastern expansion, 7, 89, 96, 102-3,
 107, 113
 — financial aid and trade, 30, 85, 91-5
 Gestapo, the, 56
 Government, parliamentary, 27, 52-3,
 56, 58
 — local, 53-5
 Grain, 9, 11, 76, 78-9, 81
 Grand Mufti, the, 20
 Grand Rabbi, the, 20
 Great Britain:
 — trade, 20, 86, 91-3, 95-6
 — relations with Turkey, 21-2, 27,
 42, 44-5, 47, 88, 98, 100, 103-4, 107,
 110-11, 114

 Greece, 15, 22, 42, 48, 93, 100, 101-3, 105,
 107, 109, 111
 — fall of, 96
 Greeks, 14, 16, 17, 20, 25, 43-7, 84, 93,
 100, 107
 — in Turkey, 15, 42-8
 Guleman, 87

 Habsburg Empire, the, 21
Halkçileri, *see* People's Houses
 Hatay, the, 99
 See Alexandretta
 Hitler, Adolf, 7, 98, 101-2, 109, 113
 Hittite type (Armenoid), 14
 Holland, 20, 90
 Holy law, *see* *Seriat*
 Home Land (*Vatan*), 37
 Hungary, 22, 96
 Hygiene, 78, 89

 India, 24, 58, 86, 103
 Industrialization, 51, 59, 60, 73-4, 80, 83-
 91, 94
 Industrial Revolution, the, 23
 Industry and Mining Bank, the, 84
 İnönü, 35n., 46
 İnönü, Ismet, President, 35n., 46, 60, 72
 Institute of Mining Study and Research,
 87
 Iran (Persia), 15, 21, 80, 86-7, 102, 111
 Iraq (Mesopotamia), 8, 15, 22, 27, 30, 48,
 81, 87-8, 98, 102, 109, 111
 Iron and iron-ore, 87, 90
 Irrigation, 9, 30, 79
 Islam, 17, 24, 32, 57, 63, 70-72, 74, 89,
 101, 106, 110
 Ismet Pasha, *see* İnönü
 Istanbul, 9-11, 17-22, 37, 40, 42-5, 70,
 80, 81, 87-8
 — University of, 31, 69
 — General Staff College, 37
 Italian Penal Code, 65n.
 Italy, 22, 38, 42, 45-8, 56, 93, 95, 98, 100,
 102-4, 106-7, 113
 Izmir, *see* Smyrna
 Izmit, 88

 Janissaries, the, 23
 Japan, 24, 73, 86
 Jews, the, 14, 20, 84
 Yugoslavia, 90, 103-4, 107-8, 111

Kamutay, *see* National Assembly
 Karabük, 81, 87, 90, 94
 Kars, 81
 Kastamonu, 64
 Kayseri, 81, 86-7, 90, 94
 Kaza (districts), 54
 Kazim Dirik, General, 55-6
 Keimar, 10, 12
 Kemal, Mustafa, *see* Atatürk
 Kemalist Movement, *see* Revolution, 1919
 Khaliqate, the, 63-4
 Kizil Irmak, River, 10, 80
 Konya, 12, 80
 Kocan, the, 62
 Kreuger, Ivan, 85
 Kuchuk Kainarji, Treaty of, 1774, 21, 23
 Kulaks, the, 73
 Kurds, the, 15, 63, 76, 81
 Kutahya, 88

- Latin script, 70
 Lausanne, Treaty of, 1923, 15, 43-9, 98
 Law, reform of, 31-2, 62-3, 65
 Lawrence, T. E., 22
 League of Nations, the, 16, 98-9, 101
Lebensraum, 12, 101-2, 112
 Leninakin, 81
 Levant, the, 20, 93, 95, 98-100, 102, 106-7,
 109-10, 114
 Liberal Party of the Republic, 59-60
 Libya, 109
 Lignite, 88
 Loans, 16, 26, 55-6, 91, 93
 Los Angeles, 69

 Macedonians, 39
 Maginot Line, the, 107
 Maize, 76
 Malta, 44, 107
 Maritza, River, 28
 Marmora, Sea of, 89
 Mehmet II, 19
 — IV, 21
 — Ali, 25, 30
 — Emin, 38
 Metric system, introduction of, 31
 Midhat Pasha, 27, 31, 52, 62
Millet system, 14, 20, 21, 25
 Millet-i-Rum, the, 20
 Mining, 30, 81, 83, 87
 Minorities, 15, 16, 25, 39, 67, 72, 100
 Mohacs, 22
 Mohair, 9, 96
 Monastir, 37
 Montreux Convention, 1936, the, 98-9, 103
 Moscow, 46, 104-5
 Moslems, 15-17, 20, 32, 64
 Mosul, 88, 98, 100, 101
 Mudania, Armistice of, 1922, 48
 Mudros, Armistice of, 1918, 22, 38
Mukhtar (village headman), 54
 Munich, 104, 108
 Mussolini, Benito, 100, 102-3
 Mustafa Kemal, *see* Atatürk

 Nansen, Dr. Fridtjof, 16
 Napoleon, 25, 37
 National Assembly (*Kamulay*), the, 44, 48,
 52-3, 55, 99, 113
 — Grand, 44
 Nationalism and nationalists, 23, 27-8,
 30, 31, 35, 39, 42-4, 46, 48, 51, 71-2,
 78, 83, 112
 Nationalist Movement, *see* Nationalism
 National Pact, 1920, the, 43-4, 48
 Navy, Turkish, 89-90
 — and mercantile marine, 94
 — British, the, 103, 107
 Nazis, *see* Germany
 Nenchâtel, Code of Civil Procedure of the
 Canton of, 65 n.
 Nicea, 17
 Nyon Patrol, the, 103

 OGPU, the, 56
 Oil, 81, 87-8, 90, 98
 Olives, 77, 91
 Orhan, 19
 Orthodox Christians, 20, 21, 39
 Osman I, 19
Osmankâ, 7, 14, 19, 21
 Ottawa Agreements, 1932, the, 93
Ottoman Bank, the, 30

 Ottoman Debt, the, 84-5, 92
 Ottoman Empire, the, 14, 15, 17-26, 28,
 30, 39, 40, 54, 57-8, 63-4, 71, 74, 84

 Palestine, 22, 30
 Papen, Franz von, 109
 Patriarchs:
 — Ecumenical, 20
 — Gregorian, 20
 People's Houses (*Halkerleri*), 70, 71
 People's Party, Republican, 47-8, 52-4,
 58, 70, 71
 — opposition group, 60
 Pera, 11
 Peter, King, of Yugoslavia, 108
 Pillars of Hercules, the, 21
 Pittsburgh, 73
 Police, Turkish, 27, 37
 Political system, Turkish, 51-61
 Polygamy, 32, 65, 67
 Pope, the, 20
 Population, 11, 12, 14, 16, 68
 Ports and harbours, 30, 94
 Prague, 104
 President, election and powers of, 44, 50
 Press, 71, 103, 105-7, 110, 113
 — freedom of the, 56, 94
 Prime Minister, appointment of, 53
 Propaganda, 56, 70-72, 98, 106, 109
 Prussian military mission, 25

 Radio, 70
 Railways, 30, 80, 81, 83, 87, 89
 Rashid Ali, 109
 Reform (movements), 26-33, 36-9, 47,
 54-7
 See Atatürk
 Reformation, the, 62
Re'îsâk, 19
 Religion, 20, 62-4, 67, 74
 Revolts, internal, 15, 25, 63, 76
 Revolution (Young Turk), 1908, 28, 30,
 37-8
 Revolution (Kemalist), 1919, 24, 30-33,
 35-6, 52, 62-3, 68, 71, 73, 112
 Rhineland *coup*, the, 98, 103
 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 105
 Roads, 54, 80, 81, 87
 — Ten-year plan for, 80
 Romans, 14
 Rum, Province of, 17
 — Empire of, 19
 Rumania, 22, 87, 96, 100, 103, 105, 108,
 110
 Russia, 8, 23, 26-8, 38-9, 45, 47, 56, 73,
 85-6, 89, 93, 101, 104-6, 109-12, 114
 — Czarist Empire, 7, 8, 21, 101
 — expansion of, 8, 21-2, 105-6, 109
 Russo-German Pact, 1939, the, 104

 Saadabad Pact, 1937, the, 102, 113
 St. Jean de Maurienne, Treaty of, 42
 Sakarya, River, 46, 81, 88
 Salokika, 36-7, 39
 Samsun, 11, 41, 81
 Sanctions, 45, 102
 Sanders, General Liman von, 38
 Sarajoglu, Sükrü, 104-5
 Schacht, Dr. Hjalmar, 92
 Schools, 27, 54-5, 68-9, 71, 77
 — folk-, 70
 Script, Arabic and Latin, 70
 Secularization, 15, 62-3, 67, 72, 74

- Serbia, 22
Seriat (Holy law), 62, 64-5 and n.
 Sèvres, Treaty of, 1920, 22, 45, 48
 Seyhan, River, 79
 Share-cropping, 76
 Siirt, 81, 87-8, 90
 Singapore, 69
 Single-party system, 53, 56, 58-9
 Sivas, 8, 81, 87
 — conference at, 1919, 43
 Slave household, the, 19, 20, 23
 Slump, 1929, the, 82, 92
 Smolensk, 110
 Smyrna (Izmir), 9, 11, 15, 16, 22, 42-5,
 47, 55, 70, 80, 87, 102
 Society for National Education and
 Training, 31
 Sofia, 38
 Spanish War, the, 102
 Sphere of Co-Prosperity, 112
 Stalin, Joseph, 109
 Standard of living, 86, 89
 Steel, 87, 90
 Straits, the, 7, 8, 22, 89, 96, 101, 106,
 109-10
 — demilitarization of, 48, 98-9
 — shipping control in, 48, 98-9
 Sugar, 81
 Suleiman the Magnificent, 21
 Sulina, 96
 Sulphur, 86
 Sultan and sultanate, 17, 19, 20, 23, 25-6,
 39-41, 43-5, 48, 64
 Sumer Bank, the, 84, 86
 Surnames, adoption of, 35
 Suvla Bay, 38
 Swiss Civil Code, 65 and n.
 Syria, 8, 22, 30, 38, 45, 89, 98-9, 106, 109
 — Nationalists, 99
 Tartars, the, 7, 14
 Textiles, 83-4, 86, 101
 Therapia, 11
 Thrace, 56, 89, 107, 110-11
 — Eastern, 7, 11, 22
 — Greek, 16
 Three Year Plan, the, 87
 Tigris, River, *see* Dicle Nehiri
 Tobacco, 11, 74, 76, 81, 91-3, 96
 Toz Göl, Lake, 72
 Trabzon, 10, 80
 Tractors, 79
 Trade, 20, 84-5, 91-6
 — clearing agreements, 92
 — Turkish Mission, 1939, 94
 Trade unions, 89
 Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1939, 86
 Tripoli, 38-9
 Tripolitania, 22
 Troy, 12
 Tunisia, 22
 Turkey, Republic of, 19, 35, 40, 50-52,
 55-7, 71-3, 76-80, 83-5
 — future of, 112-14
 — *See* People's Party
 Turkey, treaties:
 with Russia, 1920, 46
 trade agreement with Germany, 1940,
 95
 Pact with Russia, 1925, 101, 105
 with Greece, 1933, 102
 Pact with Germany, 1941, 107, 110
 Guarantee by Great Britain and Russia,
 1941, 110
 See also Ankara
 Turkish Hearth (*Türk Okagi*), the, 31-2, 43
Türk Okagi, *see* Turkish Hearth
 Turks, Seljuk, 7, 14, 17, 19
 — Ottoman, 8, 10
 — origins of the, 14, 17, 19, 31
 Two-party system, 59-60
 Ukraine, 110
Ulus, 113
 United Kingdom Commercial Corporation,
 Ltd., 94, 96
 U.S.A., 22, 73, 82, 92, 109
 Universities, 31-2, 68-9
 Ushuq, 43
 Utilities, municipal, 30, 83
 Valis (Governors), 54-5
 Valyi, Felix, *Revolution in Islam*, 36
 Van, Lake, 76
Vatan, *see* Home Land
 Veil, use of the, 65
 Venice, 20
 Venizelos, Eleutherios, 47
 Versailles, 40, 45
 Vienna, 10, 12, 21-2
 Vilayets (provinces), 54, 70
 — Eastern, 15, 22, 98
 Village Councils, 54
 — organization and influence, 73-82
 War (1914-18), 22, 28, 30, 32, 38
 — (1939-), 95-6, 99, 104-14
 Westernization, 23-8, 30, 31, 37, 51, 64-5,
 67-8, 100
 Wheat, 76, 91
 Writing, change of script, 69-70
 Yalchin, M., 113
 Yemen, 12, 21
Yeni Sabah, 113
 Yokohama, 73
 Young Turk Movement, the, 28, 30, 32, 36,
 38, 62
 See Revolution, 1908
 Ziya Gökalp, 27n., 32, 38, 44, 72
 Zonguldak, 10, 81, 83, 86, 88